People v. Legister, 75 N.Y.2d 832 (1990)
A jury verdict should be set aside when a juror conducts an independent investigation into a fact in issue and shares the results with other jurors, creating a substantial risk of prejudice to the defendant.
Summary
The New York Court of Appeals reversed a conviction due to juror misconduct. During deliberations in a robbery case involving the issue of visibility from a vehicle, a juror conducted an independent investigation by observing the scene from her own car and shared her findings with the other jurors. The court held that this unauthorized investigation and communication of its results created a substantial risk of prejudice, thus warranting a new trial. The concurring opinion emphasized the importance of jurors using their background experience but distinguished it from actively seeking new evidence outside the trial.
Facts
The defendant was convicted of robbery. A key issue at trial was whether a witness could have clearly seen the events from a certain vantage point inside a vehicle. During jury deliberations, one of the jurors, without authorization, drove her own vehicle to the location in question to assess the visibility. She then reported her observations to the other jurors.
Procedural History
The trial court convicted the defendant. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, finding no prejudice resulting from the juror’s actions. The case was then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.
Issue(s)
Whether a juror’s unauthorized independent investigation into a material fact and communication of the findings to other jurors warrants setting aside the jury verdict.
Holding
Yes, because the juror’s independent investigation and communication of her findings created a substantial risk of prejudice to the defendant.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals determined that the juror’s conduct constituted improper and prejudicial behavior. The court emphasized that jurors must base their verdicts solely on the evidence presented at trial. An independent investigation by a juror introduces evidence that the defendant has no opportunity to confront or cross-examine. The court reasoned that “[t]o allow a jury to consider evidence which was not introduced at trial is a violation of a defendant’s fundamental right to confront and cross-examine witnesses.” The court found that the juror’s experiment, which involved specific observations about visibility from a car, was directly related to a central issue in the case. Because the juror shared her findings with the other jurors, the court concluded that there was a substantial risk of prejudice to the defendant. The concurring opinion argued that jurors inevitably draw upon their own experiences, but distinguished that from actively seeking new evidence related to the specific facts of the case. Judge Fuchsberg stated, “In persuading one another to their respective viewpoints, and indeed in resolving their own doubts, jurors, like other people, employ the products of their education and experience…That is essentially all that happened in this case.” However, the majority found the juror’s actions exceeded the permissible use of background experience and created a prejudicial situation requiring a new trial.