Kornblut v. Chevron Oil Co., 62 N.Y.2d 853 (1984)
A contractual obligation to provide a service to a contracting party does not automatically create a duty of care to third parties who may benefit from that service, unless the contract demonstrates a clear intent to benefit those third parties directly or the contracting party has entirely displaced the other party’s duty.
Summary
Kornblut sued Chevron for negligence after her husband died following a delay in roadside assistance on the Thruway. Chevron had a contract with the Thruway Authority to provide rapid and efficient service. The court held that Chevron owed no duty of care to Kornblut’s husband because the contract was with the Thruway Authority, not individual drivers, and did not explicitly create a duty to third parties. The court distinguished cases where a defendant’s actions created or increased the risk of harm, finding Chevron’s inaction insufficient to establish a duty of care to the deceased. The dissent argued that the exclusive nature of Chevron’s contract, the known dangers of the Thruway, and the decedent’s reliance on Chevron’s promised service created a duty.
Facts
Mr. Kornblut’s car broke down on the New York State Thruway. Chevron Oil Co. had a contract with the Thruway Authority to provide roadside assistance. The contract stipulated that Chevron would provide rapid and efficient service. Despite a call for assistance, help did not arrive promptly. Mr. Kornblut attempted to fix the vehicle himself. While doing so, he was injured and subsequently died. Mrs. Kornblut sued Chevron, alleging negligence in failing to provide timely assistance.
Procedural History
The trial court found in favor of the plaintiff, holding that Chevron had a duty of care. The Appellate Division reversed, dismissing the complaint. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision, finding that Chevron owed no duty of care to the deceased under the circumstances.
Issue(s)
Whether Chevron, by contracting with the Thruway Authority to provide roadside assistance, assumed a duty of care to individual motorists like Mr. Kornblut, such that its failure to provide timely assistance constituted negligence?
Holding
No, because the contract between Chevron and the Thruway Authority did not create a direct duty of care to individual motorists, and Chevron’s conduct did not create or exacerbate the risk to Mr. Kornblut.
Court’s Reasoning
The court reasoned that a contractual obligation, standing alone, does not create a tort duty to third parties. To establish a duty of care to a third party, the contract must intend to benefit the third party directly, the contracting party must have entirely displaced the other party’s duty, or the contracting party must have launched a force or instrument of harm. Here, the contract was between Chevron and the Thruway Authority, not individual motorists. The court emphasized that Chevron’s inaction, while perhaps a breach of contract, did not constitute a tort. The court distinguished cases where a defendant’s actions affirmatively created or increased the risk of harm. As the court stated, “[a] contractual obligation, standing alone, will generally not give rise to tort liability in favor of a third party.” The court noted that imposing a general tort duty based solely on the contract would unduly expand liability. The dissenting opinion argued that the exclusive nature of Chevron’s contract, the foreseeable dangers of the Thruway, and the motorist’s reliance on Chevron’s promised service created a duty of care under the Restatement (Second) of Agency § 354, which states that an agent can be liable for physical harm if they undertake to act and fail to do so, creating an unreasonable risk of harm. The dissent also distinguished Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., arguing that Chevron’s service was to be furnished directly to highway users, not merely to the Thruway Authority.