People v. Cruz, 48 N.Y.2d 419 (1979)
Statutory prohibitions against driving while impaired or intoxicated are not unconstitutionally vague, even when no blood alcohol test is administered, because the terms have a commonly understood meaning and provide sufficient standards for adjudication.
Summary
The New York Court of Appeals addressed the constitutionality of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192, specifically subdivisions 1 (driving while impaired) and 3 (driving while intoxicated), in the absence of a scientific test to determine blood alcohol content. The defendant argued the terms “impaired” and “intoxicated” were unconstitutionally vague without such a test. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s dismissal, holding that the terms possess a sufficiently definite meaning to satisfy due process requirements, providing adequate warning and preventing arbitrary enforcement, even without scientific evidence.
Facts
A police officer observed the defendant driving erratically and running a red light. Upon stopping the defendant, the officer detected a strong odor of alcohol. The defendant admitted to having a couple of drinks. The defendant’s eyes were watery and bloodshot, his speech was slurred, he was unsteady on his feet, and his pupils did not dilate when a flashlight was shined in them. The defendant refused a breathalyzer test. The defendant was charged with a misdemeanor for operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol.
Procedural History
The Criminal Court dismissed the charges, finding the statute unconstitutionally vague in the absence of a blood alcohol test. The Appellate Term affirmed. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.
Issue(s)
Whether subdivisions 1 and 3 of section 1192 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, prohibiting driving while impaired and driving while intoxicated, are unconstitutionally vague when applied in the absence of a scientific test for determining blood alcohol content.
Holding
No, because the terms “impaired” and “intoxicated” have a commonly understood meaning, providing a reasonable warning of the prohibited conduct and sufficient standards for adjudication, even without a blood alcohol test.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals stated that due process requires criminal statutes to be reasonably definite, providing fair warning and preventing arbitrary enforcement. However, the Constitution requires only reasonable precision, not impossible standards. The court noted that New York law has prohibited driving while intoxicated since 1910, long before scientific tests were admissible. Scientific evidence is admissible but not essential. The Court stated that “if the general class of offenses to which the statute is directed is plainly within its terms, the statute will not be struck down as vague, even though marginal cases could be put where doubt might rise”.
The Court stated that driving while impaired prohibits driving when the driver’s ability to operate the vehicle is impaired to any extent, recognizing that individuals have different tolerances to alcohol. The applicable standard is whether the defendant’s abilities are less than what they should possess, judged by an objective standard expected of the average driver.
Intoxication is a greater degree of impairment, rendering the driver incapable of employing the physical and mental abilities needed to operate a vehicle as a reasonable and prudent driver. Intoxication is an intelligible concept to the average person and does not require expert opinion. A statute employing terms with accepted meaning, “long recognized in law and life” cannot be said to be unconstitutionally vague. The court concluded that the statute provides reasonable warning and sufficient standards even when no chemical test has been made of the driver’s blood alcohol content.