48 N.Y.2d 286 (1979)
When premises are jointly occupied, one co-occupant can consent to a search of the shared areas, and that consent is valid even if another co-occupant is present and objects to the search.
Summary
Cosme was convicted of criminal possession of a controlled substance. The police searched his apartment based on his fiancée’s consent, who also lived there, even though Cosme objected. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that when two individuals share a common right of access to property, either can consent to a search, and the other’s objection does not invalidate that consent. The court reasoned that co-occupants assume the risk that one of them might permit the common area to be searched.
Facts
Meyrle Hennessey, Cosme’s fiancée, called the police and reported that Cosme was storing a gun and cocaine in their shared apartment. Hennessey, who had been drinking, met the police outside the apartment, gave them a key, and explained how to disable the alarm. Upon entering, the police found Cosme and a companion. Despite Cosme’s protests, the police searched the apartment, finding a gun and cocaine in a bedroom closet shared by Cosme and Hennessey.
Procedural History
Cosme moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the search was illegal because it lacked probable cause and his consent. The trial court denied the motion, finding Hennessey had the authority to consent based on her joint occupancy and access. Cosme pleaded guilty to a reduced charge after the denial of his suppression motion. The Appellate Division affirmed his conviction, leading to this appeal to the New York Court of Appeals.
Issue(s)
Whether a co-occupant’s consent to a search of jointly occupied premises is valid when another co-occupant is present and expressly refuses to consent to the search.
Holding
Yes, because when individuals share common authority over premises, any one of them has the right to permit a search, and the others assume the risk that this might occur.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals rejected the agency theory, which posits that one co-tenant can waive another’s constitutional rights solely because they share an interest in the property. Instead, the court relied on the principle that an individual lacking exclusive control over premises has no reasonable expectation of privacy there. Quoting United States v. Matlock, the court stated that the authority to consent “rests…on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit the inspection in his own right and that the others have assumed the risk that one of their number might permit the common area to be searched.” By giving Hennessey an unrestricted right to share the bedroom closet, Cosme assumed the risk that she would authorize a search. The court explicitly stated that a co-occupant has no constitutional ground for complaint when a co-occupant consents to a search. Since Hennessey had common authority over the apartment and voluntarily consented, Cosme’s objections were ineffective. The court did not address whether probable cause existed or if exigent circumstances were present, as Hennessey’s consent was sufficient to justify the search. The court also did not express an opinion on areas of exclusive use within a shared dwelling.