48 N.Y.2d 1 (1979)
A defendant’s failure to raise a double jeopardy claim at trial constitutes a waiver of that defense for appellate review unless the error affects the organization of the court or the mode of proceedings prescribed by law.
Summary
The New York Court of Appeals held that a defendant’s failure to raise a double jeopardy defense before or during the second trial waived the right to assert it on appeal. The Court reasoned that the double jeopardy defense, while constitutionally significant, is a personal right that must be timely asserted. The majority distinguished this case from errors affecting the court’s organization or mode of proceedings, which can be raised for the first time on appeal. The dissent argued that established precedent required preservation of the double jeopardy defense at trial and that the majority’s decision undermined the state’s interest in efficient criminal procedure.
Facts
The defendant was initially tried for a crime, but the outcome of that trial is not specified in this excerpt. The defendant was then retried for the same crime. Before or during the second trial, the defendant did not raise a defense of double jeopardy, arguing that being tried again for the same offense violated his constitutional rights.
Procedural History
The Appellate Division’s order was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals. The specific ruling of the Appellate Division is not detailed in this excerpt. The Court of Appeals considered whether the defendant’s failure to raise the double jeopardy defense at trial precluded him from raising it on appeal.
Issue(s)
Whether a defendant’s failure to assert a double jeopardy defense prior to or during trial waives the right to raise that defense on appeal.
Holding
No, because the constitutional immunity from double jeopardy is a personal right which if not timely interposed at trial may be waived.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals stated that the “constitutional immunity from double jeopardy is a personal right which if not timely interposed at trial may be waived.” The court relied on prior case law, including People v. La Ruffa, which reaffirmed the principle that a double jeopardy defense can be waived if not raised at trial. The court distinguished the double jeopardy claim from errors affecting the organization of the court or the mode of proceedings, such as trial by a jury of fewer than 12 members or prosecution by information for an infamous crime when a Grand Jury indictment is constitutionally required. The court reasoned that permitting a defendant to raise a double jeopardy claim for the first time on appeal would undermine the State’s interest in enforcing its criminal law efficiently. As the dissent stated, “[a] defendant cannot be permitted to sit idly by while error is committed, thereby allow the error to pass into the record uncured, and yet claim the error on appeal.” The court also distinguished Menna v. New York, noting that while a guilty plea does not automatically waive a double jeopardy claim that was unsuccessfully raised before the plea, it does not preclude a finding that the defendant waived the claim by failing to raise it timely and preserve it for appellate review.