People v. Haff, 47 N.Y.2d 695 (1979)
Subdivision 3 of Section 107 of the Civil Service Law prohibits public officers from giving notice of political assessments to subordinates in government buildings, even if the notice is about the subordinates collecting the assessments themselves.
Summary
Defendants, former public officers in the Town of Hempstead, were convicted of violating Civil Service Law §107(3) for using their authority to induce political contributions from other public employees. The Appellate Term reversed, arguing the indictments failed to state a crime because merely “advising” subordinates about collecting political assessments was not prohibited. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Term, holding that giving notice of political assessments within a government building, even if related to the subordinates’ collection duties, violates the statute. The case was remitted for review of other factual and legal questions.
Facts
Defendants Phears, Haff, and Landman were Commissioners of Water, Highways, and Sanitation in the Town of Hempstead, respectively.
The defendants gave notice to their subordinates, who were subject to the Civil Service Law, that political assessments, subscriptions, and contributions were to be received and collected by such subordinates on behalf of a political organization. This occurred within a building occupied for a governmental purpose.
Procedural History
The defendants were indicted and convicted of violating subdivision 3 of section 107 of the Civil Service Law.
The Appellate Term reversed the convictions and dismissed the indictments, finding that the indictments did not state a crime under the statute.
The People appealed to the Court of Appeals.
Issue(s)
Whether subdivision 3 of section 107 of the Civil Service Law prohibits public officers from informing their subordinates within a government building that the subordinates are to collect political assessments on behalf of a political organization.
Holding
Yes, because giving such notice constitutes “giving notice of a political assessment” within the meaning of the statute, regardless of whether the notice targets the ultimate payer of the assessment or those collecting it.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals emphasized that an indictment must charge all legally material elements of a crime as prescribed by statute.
The Court interpreted the words of the statute, which prohibits anyone in a government building from giving notice of, demanding, collecting, or receiving any political assessment, subscription or contribution.
The Court reasoned that by “advising” their subordinates that they would be receiving and collecting political assessments, the defendants gave notice of a political assessment within the meaning of the section.
The Court rejected the Appellate Term’s narrow interpretation, stating that nothing in subdivision 3 of section 107 limits its prohibition to the giving of notice of a political assessment to the ultimate target of the assessment.
The concurring opinion argued that the statute’s purpose is to protect public employees from coercion. The concurrence noted that the indictment lacked any claim of coercion and that the defendants were charged solely with mentioning political contributions in a public building. They cautioned against reading criminal statutes with “all literalness” and emphasized the importance of considering the statute’s overall purpose. They noted that there were no prior reported cases where similar remarks constituted a violation.