People v. Bartley, 47 N.Y.2d 965 (1979)
When a guilty plea is vacated due to an error of law, and the original accusatory instrument is restored, retrial on the original charges is not barred by double jeopardy principles or statutory prohibitions against double prosecution.
Summary
Defendant Bartley initially pleaded guilty to a lesser charge, but the plea was later vacated because it violated a specific statute. Bartley was then retried on the original, more serious charges. The New York Court of Appeals held that the retrial did not violate double jeopardy because the initial plea and its subsequent vacatur did not constitute an acquittal. The court reasoned that the legislature has the power to allow retrial after a plea is nullified and that the vacatur of the plea restored the case to its pre-pleading status, permitting further prosecution under the original indictment.
Facts
Bartley was indicted on multiple counts, including a post-September 1, 1973, A-II felony. The court initially accepted Bartley’s plea to a class D felony in satisfaction of the entire indictment. However, accepting such a plea was prohibited by statute. After realizing the error, the court vacated the guilty plea and reinstated the not-guilty pleas on all six counts of the indictment. Bartley was then retried on the three post-September 1, 1973 counts.
Procedural History
The trial court initially accepted Bartley’s plea. Upon recognizing its error, the court vacated the plea and reinstated the original charges. Bartley was then retried and convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Bartley appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.
Issue(s)
1. Whether retrying Bartley on the original charges after the initial guilty plea was vacated violated statutory prohibitions against double prosecution under CPL 40.30(3)?
2. Whether retrying Bartley on the original charges after the initial guilty plea was vacated violated the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy?
Holding
1. No, because CPL 40.30(3) specifically allows for further prosecution when proceedings are nullified by a court order restoring the action to its pre-pleading status.
2. No, because neither the initial acceptance of the plea nor the vacatur of the guilty plea was the equivalent of an acquittal based on an adjudication of the factual elements of the charge.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals reasoned that the initial plea bargain was a