People v. Ermo, 47 N.Y.2d 863 (1979)
When two offenses are so interwoven that questioning about one necessarily involves the other, a suspect represented by counsel on one charge cannot waive counsel on the second charge without counsel being present.
Summary
William Ermo was convicted of murder. The Appellate Division overturned the conviction, and the People appealed. Ermo, represented by counsel on an assault charge, was questioned about an unrelated murder. He waived his right to counsel and confessed to the murder. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision, holding that because the questioning about the assault and murder were interwoven, Ermo could not waive his right to counsel on the murder charge without his attorney present. The dissent argued that established precedent allowed questioning on an unrelated charge, and the charges here were sufficiently distinct.
Facts
William Ermo was accused of assaulting a young schoolgirl on March 13, 1972. This led police to question him about the murder of Ursula Shiba, which occurred seven months prior. There was no initial suspicion linking Ermo to the murder; only the proximity of his address to the victim’s led to the questioning. Ermo waived his Miranda rights and confessed to the murder during questioning.
Procedural History
The trial court convicted Ermo of murder. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.
Issue(s)
Whether a defendant, who is represented by counsel on one charge, can waive his right to counsel and be questioned about a separate, but possibly related, charge without his attorney present, and whether a confession obtained during such questioning is admissible.
Holding
Yes, because the questioning regarding the assault and the murder were interwoven, the defendant could not waive his right to counsel on the murder charge without his attorney present. The confession was therefore inadmissible.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision, finding the questioning regarding the assault and the murder were interwoven. Even though the charges were initially considered separate, the sexual nature of the assault charge brought the prior unsolved murder into the discussion. The court emphasized the importance of protecting a defendant’s right to counsel, particularly when the questioning blurs the lines between ostensibly separate offenses.
The dissenting judge, Gabrielli, argued that the majority opinion disregarded established precedent. He cited cases such as People v. Stanley, People v. Simons, and People v. Coleman, which held that a defendant could waive counsel on an unrelated pending charge without counsel present. Gabrielli argued that the mere fact that the defendant has been arraigned or indicted on one charge does not prevent law-enforcement officials from interrogating him, in the absence of an attorney, about another and different crime. He asserted that the two crimes were not significantly related. He stated, “Representation by counsel in a proceeding unrelated to the investigation is insufficient to invoke” the rule that a person may not be interrogated after a lawyer has entered another proceeding in which he is represented by counsel.