People v. Byrne, 47 N.Y.2d 117 (1979)
When a defendant makes a confession, part of which is obtained before the defendant’s right to counsel attaches and part after, the portion of the confession obtained before the right to counsel attached is admissible, provided it can be clearly separated from the inadmissible portion and was not the result of prior illegality.
Summary
Dominick Byrne was convicted of grand larceny for his role in the kidnapping of Samuel Bronfman. Byrne argued that oral statements he made to FBI agents should have been suppressed because they were taken before he was allowed to consult with his attorney. The New York Court of Appeals held that statements made before Byrne’s attorney contacted the FBI were admissible because Byrne had been fully advised of his rights, no coercion was used, the statements made after the attorney’s call were excluded, and the pre-attorney statements were not tainted by any prior illegality or inextricably bound to the later statements. The Court also rejected Byrne’s argument that the agents’ deferment of his request to go to church violated his rights.
Facts
Samuel Bronfman was kidnapped at gunpoint. Byrne contacted the New York City police claiming he and Lynch were coerced into participating in the kidnapping. FBI agents questioned Byrne at FBI headquarters after advising him of his constitutional rights. Byrne initially claimed coercion, but later confessed to his role in the crime, detailing the planning and execution of the kidnapping over several hours. Later, Byrne’s attorney contacted the FBI and requested that questioning cease. The government continued questioning Byrne after receiving that call.
Procedural History
Byrne was convicted of grand larceny. The Appellate Division affirmed his conviction. Byrne appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in admitting his oral statements to the FBI agents because they continued to question him after being contacted by his attorney. The trial court suppressed written and oral statements made after the attorney’s phone call.
Issue(s)
1. Whether oral statements made by the defendant to FBI agents before his attorney contacted them, but after he had been advised of his Miranda rights, are admissible when statements made after the attorney’s contact were suppressed?
2. Whether the agents’ deferment of Byrne’s request to attend church during the interrogation was a violation of his constitutional rights?
Holding
1. Yes, because the statements made before the attorney’s contact were distinct from and not tainted by the illegally obtained statements after the attorney’s contact.
2. No, because there was no indication that Byrne’s church request flowed from an intention to seek the aid of a clergyman rather than that of a lawyer as a primary source of help and advice.
Court’s Reasoning
The court distinguished this case from People v. Failla, where the defendant’s lawyer was deliberately kept waiting while police questioned the defendant. In Byrne, the initial interrogation by the FBI agents occurred over many hours before the attorney’s call. The court emphasized that the statements elicited after the attorney’s call were either duplicative or committed to a written form and were excluded by the trial court.
The court noted the principle that an invalidly obtained prior confession may require exclusion of a subsequent validly taken one (see People v. Valerius, 31 NY2d 51, 55), reasoning that once the police have illegally caused a defendant to “let the cat out of the bag,” statements he makes afterward, no matter the safeguards the police employ as to these, may be found as a matter of fact to stem from the initial illegality (see, e.g., People v. Chapple, 38 NY2d 112, 115; People v. Stephen J. B., 23 NY2d 611, 615). However, the court pointed out that in such cases the taint is prospective only, never retrospective.
Regarding Byrne’s request to attend church, the court distinguished this from People v. Bevilacqua, where the police engaged in a “seemingly conscious scheme * * * to prevent [an 18-year-old defendant] from establishing contact with anyone who might be able to provide him with assistance or advice”. The court found no similar intent to frustrate Byrne’s access to counsel. The court reasoned that the constitutional right to counsel does not transform into a right to consult with clergymen, physicians, or others.