Barker v. Kallash, 63 N.Y.2d 19 (1984)
The emergency doctrine is not applicable when a party participated in creating the emergency, and the scope of cross-examination on credibility is within the trial judge’s discretion.
Summary
In a negligence action arising from a car accident, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that the trial court did not err in refusing to charge the emergency doctrine because the plaintiff participated in creating the emergency. Additionally, the Court held that cross-examination regarding the plaintiff’s failure to renew his driver’s license was permissible solely for the purpose of assessing credibility, and the extent of such cross-examination falls within the trial judge’s discretion. The Court found no reversible error in the trial court’s decisions.
Facts
The plaintiff, Barker, was involved in a car accident with the defendant, Kallash. At trial, Barker sought a jury instruction on the emergency doctrine to justify his speeding at the time of the accident. The trial court refused this instruction. The defendant’s counsel cross-examined Barker on his failure to renew his driver’s license. The court allowed this questioning only on the issue of Barker’s credibility.
Procedural History
The trial court rendered a verdict in favor of the defendant. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.
Issue(s)
1. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to charge the emergency doctrine as a justification for the plaintiff’s speeding at the time of the accident.
2. Whether the trial court erred in allowing cross-examination on the plaintiff’s failure to renew his driver’s license.
Holding
1. No, because the emergency doctrine has no application where the plaintiff participated in the creation of the emergency.
2. No, because the trial court allowed the jury to consider the testimony solely on the issue of credibility, and the extent of cross-examination on credibility is within the sound discretion of the trial judge.
Court’s Reasoning
Regarding the emergency doctrine, the Court of Appeals deferred to the trial court’s determination that the plaintiff’s own actions contributed to the emergency situation. The Court cited Johnson v. Hickson, 43 NY2d 906, 908, reinforcing the principle that the emergency doctrine cannot be invoked by a party who helped create the emergency.
As to the cross-examination about the driver’s license, the Court emphasized that such evidence is inadmissible on the issue of negligence itself. However, the trial court explicitly limited the jury’s consideration of this evidence to the plaintiff’s credibility. The Court of Appeals recognized the broad discretion afforded to trial judges in controlling the scope of cross-examination for impeachment purposes, citing Richardson, Evidence, § 500, at p 485. The Court stated, “The nature and extent of the cross-examination on the question of credibility is within the sound discretion of the Trial Judge. and therefore beyond our review”.
The Court also stated that it reviewed the plaintiff’s remaining arguments concerning prejudicial errors and found them insufficient to warrant reversal.