People v. OKen, 39 N.Y.2d 917 (1976)
A venue statute permitting prosecution in any county through which a vehicle passes during the commission of a crime applies even if the specific location of the crime can be determined.
Summary
The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a defendant, convicted of rape and sexual abuse, was properly tried in Kings County when the crime occurred in a vehicle that traveled through both Kings and Queens Counties. The defendant argued that because the victim could identify the specific location of the crime, the “vehicle trip” statute allowing prosecution in any county the vehicle passed through should not apply. The majority held that the trial in Kings County was improper, while the dissent argued for a liberal interpretation of the statute, asserting that it applies regardless of the victim’s ability to pinpoint the crime’s location. The dissent emphasized the remedial nature of venue statutes and the lack of prejudice to the defendant.
Facts
The defendant committed the crimes of rape and sexual abuse in a private vehicle. The vehicle trip extended through both Kings and Queens counties. The victim was able to identify the situs of the criminal act underlying the prosecution.
Procedural History
The defendant was tried and convicted of rape and sexual abuse in Kings County. The Appellate Division reversed the judgment of conviction, and the People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.
Issue(s)
Whether the private vehicle trip statute (CPL 20.40, subd 4, par [g]) applies to permit prosecution in any county through which the vehicle passed, even if the victim can identify the specific location where the crime was committed.
Holding
No, because the majority implicitly held that the vehicle trip statute doesn’t apply when the crime’s location is identifiable, thereby finding that venue in Kings County was improper in this case.
Court’s Reasoning
The dissent argued that the vehicle trip statute (CPL 20.40, subd 4, par [g]) is broad and permits prosecution of a crime committed during a multi-county trip in any county through which the vehicle passed. The dissent noted, “Nowhere in this statute is authorization to prosecute qualified in a case in which, as here, the county in which the crime was committed can be identified.” The dissent contended that the legislature could have easily limited the application of the trip statute if that was their intent. The dissent highlighted the historical context of venue rules, explaining that while common law required trial in the county where the crime occurred, this rule was modified by statutes designed to address crimes committed across multiple counties. The dissent emphasized that venue statutes are remedial and should be liberally construed, distinguishing venue from jurisdiction, which cannot be waived. The dissent stated, “Whereas a court’s jurisdictional limitations must be strictly construed, venue statutes permitting prosecution of a crime in more than one county are remedial in nature and should be liberally construed.” They pointed out that other states have specifically excluded cases where the crime’s location is determinable from similar statutes. The dissent also stressed the lack of prejudice to the defendant, who was tried in a county near the crime scene and his residence. The dissent concluded that reversing the conviction on a “technicality without social significance or impact” was unjust, particularly after the victim had already endured a trial. The majority’s reasoning is not explicitly stated in the provided text, as it is a dissent. However, it can be inferred that the majority interpreted the statute more narrowly, possibly prioritizing the traditional venue rule of trying a defendant in the county where the crime occurred when that location is known.