Long Island Lighting Co. v. State Tax Commission, 45 N.Y.2d 529 (1978): Apportioning Mortgage Recording Tax Based on Assessment Rolls

Long Island Lighting Co. v. State Tax Commission, 45 N.Y.2d 529 (1978)

When apportioning a mortgage recording tax for properties located both within and outside New York City, the State Tax Commission properly relies on the relative assessments as they appear on the assessment rolls, without adjusting for equalization rates.

Summary

Long Island Lighting Company (LILCO) challenged the State Tax Commission’s method of calculating the New York City mortgage recording tax on a mortgage covering properties both inside and outside the city. LILCO argued that equalization rates should be applied to the assessments to account for differing assessment practices across tax districts. The Court of Appeals held that the Tax Commission properly used the raw assessment roll figures without equalization, as explicitly directed by the statute. The court emphasized the Legislature’s broad authority in tax design and the literal interpretation of the statute’s language.

Facts

LILCO recorded a $50 million supplemental indenture to a mortgage on properties in Queens (NYC), Nassau, and Suffolk counties. When paying the mortgage recording tax, LILCO calculated the portion due to New York City by applying equalization rates to the actual assessments of the properties within the city. These equalization rates reflected that NYC assessed property at a higher fraction of actual value than other districts.

Procedural History

The State Tax Commission determined that LILCO owed a significantly higher amount to New York City based on the raw assessments without equalization. LILCO paid the deficiency and then sought a refund, which the Tax Commission denied. The Appellate Division initially annulled the Commission’s determination, but the Court of Appeals reversed, confirming the Commission’s method.

Issue(s)

Whether the State Tax Commission, when calculating the New York City mortgage recording tax for a mortgage covering properties both within and outside the city, is required to apply equalization rates to the property assessments to account for differing assessment practices across tax districts.

Holding

No, because Section 253-a of the Tax Law directs the Commission to apportion the tax based on the relative assessments of the real property as they appear on the last assessment rolls, without mention of equalization adjustments.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals emphasized the broad legislative authority in designing tax impositions, noting that fairness and equity are not the primary criteria for evaluating tax statutes. The court found that the Tax Commission’s method conformed literally to the mandate of Section 253-a of the Tax Law, which directs apportionment based on the relative assessments as they appear on the last assessment rolls. The court reasoned that the Legislature could have easily provided for incorporating the equalization concept into the determination of the recording tax if it had chosen to do so, considering that fractional assessments and equalization rates were well-established at the time of the statute’s enactment. The court dismissed LILCO’s reliance on the last sentence of Section 260, which allows the Tax Commission to establish an equitable basis of apportionment when the standard provisions are “inapplicable or inadequate,” because the court deemed the standard provisions to be both applicable and adequate in this case. The court concluded that the Tax Commission’s determination was not arbitrary, unreasonable, or otherwise invalid, emphasizing the importance of adhering to the literal language of the tax statute. The court stated, “That paragraph directs the commission to apportion the tax ‘between the respective tax districts upon the basis of the relative assessments of such real property as the same appear on the last assessment rolls’ when the real property covered by the mortgage is situated in more than one tax district. This is precisely what the commission did in this instance.”