Matter of Ginsberg, 43 N.Y.2d 260 (1977)
A New York attorney’s conviction of a federal felony mandates automatic disbarment, regardless of whether the equivalent conduct would constitute a felony under New York law.
Summary
This case addresses whether a New York attorney’s conviction for a federal felony automatically triggers disbarment under New York Judiciary Law, even if the underlying conduct wouldn’t be a felony under New York law. The Court of Appeals held that it does, extending the automatic disbarment rule to all federal felony convictions. The majority reasoned that prior case law interpreting the statute mandates this result, while the dissent argued for a more nuanced approach that considers the gravity of the offense and mitigating circumstances.
Facts
Ginsberg, an attorney admitted to practice in New York, was convicted of a federal felony. The specific nature of the federal felony is not detailed in this opinion. The issue before the court was solely whether this federal felony conviction automatically required his disbarment in New York.
Procedural History
The case reached the New York Court of Appeals to determine the proper application of Judiciary Law § 90(4) regarding the disbarment of attorneys convicted of felonies.
Issue(s)
Whether a conviction for any federal felony mandates automatic disbarment of a New York attorney, irrespective of whether the conduct would constitute a felony under New York law.
Holding
Yes, because prior interpretations of Judiciary Law § 90(4) mandate automatic disbarment for any felony conviction, including federal felonies, without regard to whether the equivalent conduct is a felony under New York law.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court majority based their decision on the precedent set by Matter of Donegan, 282 N.Y. 285, which interpreted Judiciary Law § 90(4) to require automatic disbarment upon felony conviction. They extended this rule to all federal felony convictions, stating that the statute’s language and prior judicial interpretations left no room for considering whether the underlying conduct would constitute a felony under New York law. The Court emphasized the need for a clear and consistently applied rule. The dissenting judges argued that the majority’s decision was an unwarranted extension of the disbarment rule and a direct overruling of the spirit, if not the letter, of Donegan. They contended that the gravity of the offense and mitigating circumstances should be considered before imposing such a severe penalty as disbarment, stating that a rigid, per se rule is needlessly harsh. The dissent argued for a more flexible approach that allows for consideration of individual circumstances, quoting the concurring opinion in Matter of Chu, 42 N.Y.2d 490, 495, which advocated for firm discipline without sacrificing fairness and reason. The dissent predicted that the majority’s inflexible rule would lead to aberrant results that could only be avoided by legislative action.