People v. Tompkins, 45 N.Y.2d 748 (1978)
Once an attorney has entered a criminal proceeding, a defendant in custody cannot waive the right to counsel unless the attorney is physically present during the waiver.
Summary
Tompkins was arrested for robbery and, after receiving Miranda warnings, learned an accomplice implicated him. After speaking with his attorney by phone, Tompkins told police he would talk despite his attorney’s advice. He then confessed to multiple robberies. The County Courts suppressed these statements, but the Appellate Division reversed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, holding that a defendant in custody cannot waive the right to counsel without the attorney’s physical presence, solidifying the principle established in People v. Hobson. A phone consultation does not satisfy the requirement of counsel’s presence for a valid waiver.
Facts
On December 23, 1974, Tompkins was arrested for a robbery at a Seven-Eleven store.
After receiving Miranda warnings, he learned an accomplice implicated him.
Tompkins requested and received permission to call his mother and subsequently received a call from his attorney.
After the call, Tompkins told the investigating officer his attorney advised him not to speak, but he intended to do so anyway.
Police then interrogated Tompkins, obtaining confessions to the Fishkill robbery and other robberies in Orange and Dutchess Counties.
Procedural History
Tompkins was prosecuted in Orange and Dutchess Counties.
In both counties, Tompkins moved to suppress his statements. The County Courts granted the motions.
The Appellate Division reversed each order, holding the confessions admissible.
The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, reinstating the County Court orders.
Issue(s)
Whether a defendant in custody, who has spoken to an attorney by phone, can validly waive the right to counsel without the attorney being physically present during the waiver.
Whether Tompkins’s statement can be considered a spontaneous admission, making it admissible despite the right to counsel.
Holding
No, because once an attorney enters a criminal proceeding, a defendant in custody cannot waive the right to counsel unless the attorney is physically present. A phone call does not constitute presence.
No, because Tompkins’s statement was not a spontaneous admission but an attempt to waive his right to counsel, which is invalid without the attorney’s physical presence.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals relied heavily on People v. Hobson, which established that once a lawyer enters a criminal proceeding, a defendant in custody may only waive the right to counsel in the lawyer’s presence. The court explicitly rejected the argument that a phone call constitutes the “presence of counsel.” The court stated, “[t]his attenuated interpretation of the meaning of ‘presence of counsel’ is totally unacceptable.”
The court emphasized that the Hobson rule is meant to ensure that any waiver of a constitutional right is competent, intelligent, and voluntary. A mere phone call from counsel does not provide sufficient protection for this right.
Regarding spontaneous admissions, the court distinguished this case from People v. Kaye, where the defendant volunteered a statement. Here, Tompkins was attempting to waive his right to counsel, not making a spontaneous admission. The court declined to expand the Kaye rationale to include waivers of counsel. The court emphasized, “[O]nce an attorney has entered a criminal proceeding on behalf of a defendant, the defendant in custody may not waive his right to counsel, spontaneously or otherwise, in the absence of the lawyer.”
The decision reinforces the protection of the right to counsel under the New York Constitution, ensuring that a defendant’s waiver is truly knowing and voluntary, with the benefit of counsel’s physical presence and guidance.