People v. Sakow, 45 N.Y.2d 131 (1978)

A person can be held criminally liable for conduct constituting an offense performed in the name of or on behalf of a corporation to the same extent as if the conduct were performed in their own name.

Summary

Walter Sakow was convicted of violating the New York City fire code for failing to correct hazards in buildings owned by corporations he controlled. Sakow argued he wasn’t liable because the buildings were owned by corporations and that he didn’t receive proper notice of the violations. The court held that Sakow could be held criminally liable for actions taken on behalf of the corporations, and that he had sufficient notice of the violations, despite technical arguments about the method of delivery. The court emphasized that the purpose of the fire code was to protect public safety, and individuals cannot hide behind corporate structures to avoid responsibility.

Facts

The buildings at 154-160 East 91st Street, Manhattan, owned by a series of corporations controlled by Sakow, were in a dilapidated and dangerous condition, with multiple fires and fatalities. The Fire Department issued violation orders to correct the hazards. Sakow, the active manager and dominant controlling force behind these corporations, failed to comply with the orders. Sakow had previously pleaded guilty to similar charges, but a corporation was substituted as the pleading defendant.

Procedural History

The Criminal Court of the City of New York convicted Sakow of violating the fire code. The Appellate Term, First Department, upheld the judgment. Sakow appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

Issue(s)

1. Whether Sakow could be held criminally liable for fire code violations on properties owned by corporations he controlled, but not held in his name directly?
2. Whether the delivery of the violation orders was sufficient to establish notice to Sakow, considering the requirements of the Administrative Code?

Holding

1. Yes, because Penal Law § 20.25 states that a person is criminally liable for conduct constituting an offense which he performs or causes to be performed in the name of or on behalf of a corporation to the same extent as if such conduct were performed in his own name or behalf.
2. Yes, because the purpose of the violation orders is to ensure prompt correction of fire hazards, and Sakow had actual notice of the violations through his attorney, Edwin Frederick.

Court’s Reasoning

The court reasoned that Sakow’s control over the corporations made him responsible for the violations. It cited Penal Law § 20.25, emphasizing that corporate structures cannot shield individuals from criminal liability when they act on behalf of a corporation. The court stated, “[a] person is criminally liable for conduct constituting an offense which he performs or causes to be performed in the name of or in behalf of a corporation to the same extent as if such conduct were performed in his own name or behalf.” The court also noted that the purpose of the fire code was to protect public safety. Regarding notice, the court found that Sakow’s attorney, Edwin Frederick, received the violation orders and communicated their contents to Sakow. The court highlighted the fact that Frederick stated that Sakow wished to clear up the fire department’s complaints but that he did not have a current list of the violations. Travis thereupon had one of his subordinates compile such a list; these were embodied in the three violation orders on which the present prosecution was predicated. The court concluded that, regardless of strict compliance with the service requirements of the Administrative Code, Sakow had actual knowledge of the violations, satisfying the requirement for willfulness. The Court further explained that the code’s concern for the specification of the address rather than the identity of the individuals involved supports the purpose of the code as prompt prevention of conflagrations, thus the enumerated forms of service are not necessarily exclusive. The court also noted that criminal liability is imposed only on one “who shall wilfully, violate, or neglect, or refuse to comply”.