People v. Mayo, 48 N.Y.2d 245 (1979)
Under New York Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) 310.70 as it existed in 1973, a defendant could not be retried on unresolved concurrent counts of an indictment after a partial verdict of acquittal was rendered, even if the defendant requested a mistrial.
Summary
Mayo was indicted on multiple charges stemming from a single stabbing incident. At his first trial, the jury acquitted him of attempted murder but deadlocked on assault and weapons possession. Mayo requested a mistrial, which was granted. He was then retried and convicted on the remaining charges. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that under the CPL 310.70 as it existed at the time, retrial was barred because the unresolved counts were concurrent, not consecutive, to the count on which he was acquitted. The court also held that the defendant’s mistrial request did not waive this statutory protection.
Facts
Mayo was involved in an incident at a bar where he allegedly stabbed a patron. He was subsequently indicted for attempted murder, first-degree assault, and felony weapons possession, all stemming from the single stabbing incident.
Procedural History
The first trial resulted in an acquittal on the attempted murder charge, but the jury deadlocked on the remaining counts. The defendant requested a mistrial, which was granted. Prior to the second trial, Mayo’s motion to prohibit a retrial was denied. The second trial resulted in convictions on the remaining counts. The Appellate Division modified the conviction, reversing the weapons possession conviction but affirming the assault conviction and rejecting the argument that retrial was barred. The New York Court of Appeals then reversed the Appellate Division, dismissing the indictment.
Issue(s)
Whether, under CPL 310.70(2) as it existed in 1973, a defendant could be retried on unresolved concurrent counts of an indictment after the jury rendered a partial verdict of acquittal on another count arising from the same single act.
Holding
No, because the unresolved counts were concurrent, not consecutive, to the count upon which the defendant was acquitted. Further, the defendant’s request for a mistrial does not waive the statutory bar to retrial.
Court’s Reasoning
The court focused on the language of CPL 310.70(2) as it existed at the time of the first trial, which allowed retrial only on “consecutive” counts after a partial verdict. The court stated that consecutive sentences are only authorized where the crimes charged are the result of separate successive acts, rather than a single act. Here, all counts stemmed from the single act of stabbing the victim. Thus, the counts were concurrent, and retrial was barred by the statute. The court reasoned that the statute’s express wording did not allow retrial of anything but consecutive counts. The court explicitly rejected the argument that Mayo’s request for a mistrial removed the statutory impediment to retrial. The court contrasted CPL 310.70(2) with CPL 310.60, which allows for retrial with virtually no limitation when a jury is discharged before any verdict, particularly when counsel consents. Because 310.70(2) makes no mention of counsel, Mayo’s mistrial request was irrelevant. The court also rejected the argument that the statute was not intended to bar retrial following a partial verdict of acquittal, noting that the express terms of the statute do not suggest any such distinction. The court stated that it “should not strain for an interpretation for which there is no express or even inferable foundation in the statute itself.”