Matter of Kleinman v. McCoy, 48 N.Y.2d 887 (1979)
When interpreting statutes regarding salary increments for public employees, the effective date specified in the statute is controlling, and prior service generally does not count unless explicitly stated.
Summary
This case concerns the interpretation of a New York Judiciary Law provision regarding longevity salary increments for court employees. The petitioners argued that their continuous service, including time served before April 1, 1972, should be considered when calculating their entitlement to these increments. The Court of Appeals held that the statute’s language clearly limited the calculation of continuous service to the period after April 1, 1972, thus denying the petitioners’ claim for credit for prior service. The court emphasized the importance of the statute’s plain language and the specific effective date.
Facts
The petitioners were court employees seeking longevity salary increments under subdivision 3 of section 219 of the Judiciary Law. They contended that their continuous service in their positions should include service rendered before April 1, 1972, the date specified in the statute. The Administrative Board of the Judicial Conference calculated their salaries as if they had been allocated to grade 27 effective April 1, 1972. The dispute arose over whether service prior to this date should be included in calculating longevity increments.
Procedural History
The case originated in Supreme Court. The Appellate Division’s order was appealed to the Court of Appeals. Justice Greenblott dissented at the Appellate Division, agreeing with the petitioners’ interpretation regarding the initial salary calculation. The Court of Appeals modified the Appellate Division’s order, remitting the matter to the Supreme Court with directions to enter judgment ordering the recalculation of salaries as if the petitioners had been allocated to grade 27 effective April 1, 1972, but affirmed the decision that prior service did not count toward longevity increments.
Issue(s)
Whether, for purposes of reckoning entitlement to longevity increments under subdivision 3 of section 219 of the Judiciary Law, continuous service in the petitioners’ positions should extend to service prior to April 1, 1972.
Holding
No, because the statute’s language clearly limits continuous service to that rendered after April 1, 1972. The words “thereafter” and “such service” in the statute refer specifically to the period following the specified date.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court focused on the plain language of the statute. The court stated: “The limitation of the statute becomes clear with the elision of unnecessary words and the addition of emphasis—’when an employee holding a position allocated to a salary grade prescribed in subdivision one * * * has reached, on or after April first, nineteen hundred seventy-two, a salary equal to or in excess of the maximum salary of the grade of his position and thereafter has rendered continuous service in such position * * * he shall be entitled, on the first day of the fiscal year following completion of five years of such service* to an additional increment of the grade to which his position is allocated, and following completion of ten years of such service, to a second additional increment of such grade’.” The court concluded that “thereafter” unmistakably relates to April 1, 1972, and “such service” refers to continuous service rendered after that date. Thus, the court rejected the petitioners’ attempt to include service prior to April 1, 1972, in the calculation of their longevity increments. The court did not discuss any dissenting or concurring opinions beyond acknowledging Justice Greenblott’s dissent at the Appellate Division on a different point.