People v. Preston, 41 N.Y.2d 505 (1977)

Evidence of prior criminal conduct is inadmissible to show criminal propensity, but it may be admissible if directly probative of the crime charged and its probative value outweighs the potential prejudice to the defendant.

Summary

The defendant was convicted of criminal sale of a controlled substance. The prosecution presented evidence of a prior transaction between the defendant and an undercover officer, as well as testimony that the defendant had previously directed the officer to pay a third party. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the evidence of the prior transaction was admissible because it was inextricably interwoven with the crime charged and highly probative. The court also found that while the testimony regarding payments to a third party was inadmissible, the trial court’s prompt curative instruction to the jury was sufficient to prevent prejudicial error. The court emphasized the importance of balancing the probative value of prior bad acts evidence against its potential for prejudice.

Facts

An undercover officer arranged a drug purchase from the defendant through two intermediaries. During the transaction, the defendant and the officer referred to a prior drug deal, with the defendant claiming the officer owed him money from that earlier transaction. This conversation was taped and introduced as evidence. The officer eventually purchased cocaine and heroin from the defendant, with the intermediaries facilitating the exchange.

Procedural History

The defendant was indicted and convicted by a jury for criminal sale of a controlled substance. The defendant appealed, arguing that the admission of evidence of prior criminal conduct constituted reversible error. The Appellate Division sustained the conviction, and the defendant appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

Issue(s)

1. Whether the trial court erred in admitting the undercover officer’s testimony regarding a prior drug transaction with the defendant.
2. Whether the trial court erred in allowing the undercover officer to testify that, on prior occasions, the defendant directed him to make payments to a third party.

Holding

1. No, because the evidence of the prior transaction was inextricably interwoven with the present crime charged and was highly probative, outweighing any potential prejudice.
2. No, because the trial court recognized the inadmissibility of the statement regarding payments to a third party and immediately directed the jury to disregard it, thereby curing any potential prejudice.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals reasoned that while evidence of uncharged criminal conduct is generally inadmissible to show criminal propensity, it can be admissible if offered for a relevant purpose other than to show a criminal disposition. Citing People v. Molineux, the court noted that such evidence might be admissible to prove motive, intent, absence of mistake, a common scheme or plan, or identity. The court emphasized that the Molineux categories are illustrative, not exclusive. In this case, the conversation about the prior transaction was “intrinsic to the bargaining between defendant and Officer Molfetta” and concerned the price to be paid and the quality of the drugs. This evidence was deemed highly probative and directly related to the crime charged. As the court stated, “[w]hen the conversation is so inextricably interwoven with the crime charged in the indictment it may be received in evidence…where, as in this case, the value of the evidence clearly outweighs any possible prejudice.”

Regarding the officer’s testimony about prior payments to a third party, the court found that this evidence did not adequately demonstrate a common plan or scheme. However, the trial court’s prompt curative instruction to the jury was sufficient to negate any prejudice to the defendant. The court noted that the trial judge sustained the objection and directed the jury to disregard the statement, declaring, “[i]t is not evidence in this case.” The court concluded that, considering the admissibility of the initial conversation and the curative instruction, there was no prejudicial error warranting a new trial.