People v. Stanard, 42 N.Y.2d 74 (1977)
A trial court may limit cross-examination of a witness regarding their current identity, address, and occupation if there is a credible showing that such disclosure would endanger the witness’s safety, balancing the defendant’s right to confrontation with the witness’s need for protection.
Summary
The defendant, a former police officer, was convicted of perjury for falsely denying his attendance at a meeting with other officers and a known gambler. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to prove the falsity of his statements and that limitations on cross-examination of prosecution witnesses, who were relocated for their safety, did not violate the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights. The court emphasized the trial judge’s discretion in balancing the defendant’s right to confrontation with the witnesses’ need for protection from potential harm.
Facts
A Grand Jury investigated police corruption involving protection payments to officers from illegal gambling operations. The defendant, a police officer, testified under immunity, denying that he attended a meeting on January 8, 1968, with other officers and a gambler named Juan Carreras at Carreras’ residence. The prosecution alleged this meeting was to ensure the continuation of protection payments. Carreras and his wife testified that the meeting occurred, and protection payments were discussed. The Carreras family had been relocated and given new identities due to safety concerns following their cooperation in the investigation.
Procedural History
The defendant was convicted of perjury in the first degree in the Bronx County Supreme Court. His first conviction was reversed due to the introduction of prejudicial background testimony. He was retried, convicted again, and the Appellate Division affirmed the second conviction. The defendant appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.
Issue(s)
1. Whether the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to prove the falsity of the defendant’s statements before the Grand Jury.
2. Whether the trial court’s limitation on the cross-examination of prosecution witnesses regarding their current identities, addresses, and occupations violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation.
3. Whether the defendant’s right to a fair trial was violated by the trial court’s handling of Patrolman Serpico’s potential testimony and jury voir dire.
Holding
1. Yes, because the testimony of two witnesses, Juan and Dolores Carreras, corroborated the defendant’s presence at the meeting, satisfying the corroboration requirement for perjury convictions.
2. No, because the trial court properly balanced the defendant’s right to confrontation with the witnesses’ need for protection, and the defendant failed to demonstrate the materiality of the restricted information to his guilt or innocence.
3. No, because the trial court appropriately managed the potential introduction of Serpico’s testimony and the voir dire process to prevent prejudice to the defendant.
Court’s Reasoning
The court found sufficient evidence to support the perjury conviction, emphasizing that two witnesses directly contradicted the defendant’s sworn statements. The court addressed the cross-examination issue by stating the right to cross-examine is not unlimited, citing Alford v. United States and Smith v. Illinois. It articulated a balancing test: “Where the question on cross-examination is one that is normally permissible under the rules of evidence, the objecting party must come forward with some showing of why the witness should be excused from answering the question. Excuse may arise from a showing that the question will harass, annoy, humiliate or endanger the witness. The burden then shifts to the questioning party to demonstrate the materiality of the requested information to the issue of guilt or innocence.” The court held that the prosecution sufficiently demonstrated a valid interest in protecting the witnesses, shifting the burden to the defendant to show the materiality of the restricted information. The defendant failed to meet this burden, especially considering the extensive cross-examination already permitted. The court also found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion regarding Serpico’s testimony, because the testimony was ultimately never admitted, and the judge took steps to prevent any mention of Serpico during jury selection. Finally, the court rejected the defendant’s claim of prosecutorial misconduct concerning his personnel file, as he failed to present any specific facts suggesting the suppression of exculpatory evidence. The court said that materiality is an essential element of first degree perjury (see People v Teal, 196 NY 372, 376), and that false swearing, to be material, must reflect on the matter under consideration during the action or proceeding in which it is made.