Fishman v. Fishman, 42 N.Y.2d 856 (1977)
A court can amend a judgment nunc pro tunc to correct errors, particularly in matrimonial actions, provided the amended judgment aligns with the nature of the action indicated in the original summons.
Summary
In this case, the New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a trial court could amend a divorce judgment to a separation judgment nunc pro tunc (retroactively). The initial summons sought a separation, but the trial court erroneously granted a divorce. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court had the discretion to amend the judgment to reflect the relief requested in the summons, namely a separation. Further, the Court noted that a subsequent ex parte California divorce decree obtained by the husband might not be entitled to full faith and credit in New York concerning the wife’s property rights.
Facts
The wife commenced a matrimonial action seeking a separation from her husband. The summons served on the husband stated that the relief sought was a judgment of separation, including alimony, child support, and counsel fees. However, the trial court improperly awarded the wife a divorce instead of a separation.
Subsequent to the New York decree, the husband obtained an ex parte divorce decree in California.
Procedural History
The trial court initially granted a divorce to the wife, despite the summons seeking only a separation.
The Appellate Division’s order was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remitted the case to the Appellate Division for consideration of the issues on the merits.
Issue(s)
Whether the trial court had the power to amend the judgment nunc pro tunc to award a separation instead of a divorce, given that the summons indicated a separation was the relief sought.
Holding
Yes, because CPLR 5019(a) empowers the court to correct errors in judgments, and the amended judgment would align with the nature of the action as stated in the summons served on the defendant.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals reasoned that the commencement of the action satisfied the requirements of Domestic Relations Law § 232(a) regarding service of a summons in a matrimonial action for separation. Although the trial court erred in granting a divorce when the summons sought a separation, the court retained the discretion to amend the judgment retroactively (nunc pro tunc) to grant a separation. The court relied on CPLR 5019(a), which permits courts to correct errors in judgments. The amended judgment would then align with the Domestic Relations Law’s requirement that the judgment be of the same nature as indicated in the summons. The Court also noted that the California divorce decree might not be entitled to full faith and credit in New York regarding the wife’s property rights, citing Estin v. Estin. As stated in the memorandum opinion, “Such corrective action created a judgment which, as is required by the Domestic Relations Law, was of the same nature as was indicated in the summons served personally upon the defendant within the State.”