Park v. Chessin, 400 N.Y.S.2d 950 (1977)
In a case of alleged medical malpractice for failure to diagnose a fetal defect, a cause of action may exist for the parents’ emotional distress and expenses related to raising the child with the defect, but the court did not reach the issue of whether a child can recover for wrongful life when the defendant’s failure to perform a test was within the permissible exercise of medical judgment.
Summary
The plaintiffs, parents of a child born with Cri-du-chat syndrome, sued the defendant doctors for medical malpractice, alleging that the doctors failed to perform an amniocentesis during pregnancy, which would have revealed the child’s chromosomal defect and allowed the parents to make an informed decision about terminating the pregnancy. The court declined to rule on the complex legal questions of whether parents can recover for emotional distress and the costs of raising a disabled child or whether a child can recover for “wrongful life” because the defendant’s actions were within the bounds of permissible medical judgment at the time.
Facts
The plaintiff mother consulted with the defendant doctors for genetic counseling during her pregnancy. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants negligently failed to advise and perform an amniocentesis. The plaintiffs asserted that this procedure would have revealed that the child was afflicted with Cri-du-chat syndrome, a chromosomal defect causing severe physical and mental retardation. The parents claimed that if they had known about the defect, they would have obtained an abortion.
Procedural History
The lower court’s decision to dismiss the six causes of action was appealed. The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal. The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the Appellate Division’s order.
Issue(s)
Whether the defendant’s failure to perform an amniocentesis constituted medical malpractice, considering the medical history of the patient and the state of medical knowledge in 1969 regarding the amniocentesis test, or was it instead a permissible exercise of medical judgment?
Holding
No, because the defendants’ failure to perform the test was a permissible exercise of medical judgment and not a departure from accepted medical practice at the time.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, holding that the plaintiffs did not raise an issue of fact to counter the defendants’ evidence that their failure to perform the amniocentesis was within the bounds of permissible medical judgment. The court cited Pike v. Honsinger, 155 N.Y. 201, which establishes that a physician is not liable for negligence if they exercise their best judgment in applying their skill and knowledge. Because the defendants’ actions were deemed a permissible exercise of medical judgment based on the medical information available at the time (1969), the court did not address the broader legal questions presented by the case. The court stated, “our review of the record does not demonstrate that an issue of fact was raised by the plaintiffs in the face of the uncontroverted showing by the defendants that, on the basis of the patient’s medical history and the state of medical knowledge regarding the use of the amniocentesis test in 1969, the defendants’ failure to perform the test was no more than a permissible exercise of medical judgment and not a departure from then accepted medical practice”. The Court avoided deciding the novel issues concerning “wrongful life” and the extent of the duty owed by physicians in such circumstances, because the factual predicate for reaching those issues was absent.