41 N.Y.2d 926 (1977)
The statute of limitations for filing a discrimination complaint begins to run when the alleged discriminatory decision is manifested, not when the employment term ends or when internal grievance procedures are exhausted.
Summary
This case concerns the timeliness of a discrimination complaint filed by a former employee of Queensborough Community College. The Court of Appeals held that the one-year statute of limitations began to run when the employee was notified that she would not be reappointed, not when her employment term concluded. The court reasoned that the notification of non-reappointment constituted the alleged unlawful discriminatory practice. The invocation of grievance procedures did not toll the statute of limitations because it was merely an alternative remedy. This decision emphasizes the importance of promptly filing discrimination claims from the date of the discriminatory act’s clear communication.
Facts
Ethne E. K. Marenco was employed by Queensborough Community College. She received notice that she would not be reappointed. Marenco subsequently filed a complaint alleging unlawful discrimination. The complaint was filed more than one year after receiving notice of non-reappointment but within one year of the end of her employment term and after exhausting internal grievance procedures.
Procedural History
The case reached the Court of Appeals of the State of New York after proceedings before the State Human Rights Appeal Board and lower courts. The specific rulings of the lower courts are not detailed in this memorandum decision, but the Court of Appeals affirmed the order, implicitly agreeing with the determination that the complaint was time-barred.
Issue(s)
Whether the statute of limitations for filing a discrimination complaint begins to run from the date the employee receives notice of the discriminatory decision (non-reappointment) or from a later date, such as the end of the employment term or the exhaustion of internal grievance procedures.
Holding
No, because the alleged discriminatory practice was the manifested decision not to reappoint the complainant, and the act of giving notice of non-reappointment immediately gave rise to a cause of action.
Court’s Reasoning
The court based its reasoning on the plain language of Executive Law § 297(5), which requires a complaint to be filed within one year after the alleged unlawful discriminatory practice. The court determined that the discriminatory practice occurred when the college notified Marenco of its decision not to reappoint her. The court stated, “The act of giving complainant notice that she would not be reappointed gave rise immediately to a ’cause of action’, as the Appellate Division observed, and therefore started the running of the limitation period.” The court also analogized the situation to general civil practice under the CPLR, where a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff possesses a legal right to relief. Furthermore, the court held that invoking a grievance procedure, being merely an alternative remedy, does not toll the statute of limitations. The court cited the Supreme Court case of Electrical Workers v Robbins & Meyers, 429 US 229, 236-240, to support this conclusion, reinforcing the principle that alternative remedies do not extend the deadline for filing discrimination claims.