People v. Martin, 47 N.Y.2d 880 (1979)
A defendant may enter a plea of guilty to the entire indictment, including inclusory concurrent counts, and CPL 300.40(3)(b), requiring dismissal of lesser inclusory concurrent counts, applies only after a trial verdict, not a guilty plea.
Summary
The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a defendant can plead guilty to an entire indictment, including lesser inclusory concurrent counts. The Court held that, absent a constitutional issue, CPL 220.10 mandates that a defendant can plead guilty to the entire indictment as a matter of right. The provision requiring dismissal of lesser inclusory concurrent counts (CPL 300.40(3)(b)) only applies after a trial and a guilty verdict on the greatest count, not after a guilty plea. This distinction is supported by sound policy, as it prevents a defendant from potentially avoiding all criminal sanction after a voluntary guilty plea.
Facts
The specific facts of the underlying crime are not detailed in the Court of Appeals decision. However, the core issue revolves around the defendant’s plea to the entire indictment, which included inclusory concurrent counts.
Procedural History
The Appellate Division dismissed the inclusory concurrent counts. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, reinstated the inclusory concurrent counts, and remitted the matter to the Appellate Division for consideration of the facts.
Issue(s)
Whether CPL 220.10 and CPL 300.40(3)(b) permit a defendant to plead guilty to the entire indictment, including inclusory concurrent counts, or whether the latter statute requires dismissal of the lesser counts even after a guilty plea.
Holding
Yes, because CPL 220.10 provides that a defendant may plead guilty to the entire indictment as a matter of right, and CPL 300.40(3)(b) applies only after a trial verdict, not a guilty plea.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals based its decision on the plain language of CPL 220.10, which states that a defendant may enter a plea of guilty to the entire indictment, and CPL 300.40(3)(b), which requires dismissal of lesser inclusory concurrent counts only after a trial and a guilty verdict on the greatest count. The court emphasized that Article 300 deals only with trials and does not apply to convictions obtained on a plea of guilty. The court distinguished the case from situations involving trial verdicts, highlighting that a guilty plea lacks the full factual record established during a trial. The court noted that “[p]ermitting the court to accept a plea of guilty to the entire indictment, even when a series of inclusory concurrent counts is involved, prevents a defendant, having voluntarily pleaded guilty, from avoiding all criminal sanction by obtaining on appeal a reversal of his conviction on a single count of the indictment.” The court further stated, “In the instance of a trial verdict there is a full record which establishes the facts upon which the prosecution relies to support the conviction. In the case of a plea of guilty there is no such record and there usually are only varying degrees of admissions of guilt other than the fact of the plea.”