Matter of Levy, 38 N.Y.2d 283 (1975): Determining School District Responsibility for Foster Children’s Education Costs

Matter of Levy, 38 N.Y.2d 283 (1975)

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The cost of instructing pupils placed in family homes at board by social services districts or state agencies is the responsibility of the school district where the pupil resided when the district or agency assumed support, unless a district or agency had previously assumed tuition costs before January 1, 1974.

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Summary

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This case concerns which school district bears the cost of educating children placed in foster homes by social services districts or state agencies. The Court of Appeals held that the financial burden falls on the school district where the pupil resided when the social services district or state agency assumed responsibility for their support and maintenance. However, if a social services district or state agency had assumed responsibility for tuition costs prior to January 1, 1974, that entity remains responsible. The Court rejected a proposed interpretation that would have broadly relieved school districts of these costs and declined to address constitutional challenges raised by municipal entities.

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Facts

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The Ellenville Central School District sought a determination regarding responsibility for the cost of providing public education to children residing in foster homes within its district. These children had been placed in the foster homes by various social services districts and state agencies. The litigation expanded to include multiple parties, allowing for a comprehensive determination of cost responsibility under Education Law § 3202(5)(a). The central question was the correct interpretation of the statute assigning financial responsibility for these educational services.

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Procedural History

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The case originated in a lower court, which rendered a decision regarding the responsibility for the educational costs. The Appellate Division reviewed this decision. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s order, ultimately affirming it, but also modifying certain aspects of the lower court’s judgment.

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Issue(s)

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1. Whether the proviso in Education Law § 3202(5)(a), referring to entities that “assumed responsibility for tuition costs,” applies only to entities that specifically assumed responsibility for tuition costs as distinct from general support and maintenance prior to January 1, 1974.r
2. Whether municipal entities have the substantive right to raise constitutional challenges against state statutes regarding the allocation of educational costs.r
3. Whether a presumption can be established that the school district where a pupil resided immediately before transfer to a receiving school district is responsible for the cost of instruction.

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Holding

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1. Yes, because the statute explicitly distinguishes between responsibility for “support and maintenance” and “tuition costs,” indicating different meanings were intended. r
2. No, because municipal entities generally lack the substantive right to challenge state statutes on constitutional grounds unless compliance with the statute forces them to violate a constitutional proscription.r
3. No, because there is no basis in the statute or its legislative history to create such a presumption.

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Court’s Reasoning

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The court interpreted Education Law § 3202(5)(a) by focusing on the plain language of the statute, which distinguishes between