40 N.Y.2d 1042 (1976)
A union member elected to the executive board, receiving only expense reimbursement, is not considered an employee of the union for worker’s compensation purposes absent an employment agreement, control by the union, or right of discharge.
Summary
William Nallan, Jr., a member of Motion Picture Studio Mechanics Union, Local No. 52, sought worker’s compensation benefits, claiming he was an employee of the union when injured. Nallan served on the union’s executive board and received a stipend for expenses. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, holding that Nallan was not an employee of the union. The court emphasized the absence of an employment agreement, the union’s lack of control over Nallan’s activities, and the lack of the right to discharge him. These factors negated the existence of an employer-employee relationship necessary for worker’s compensation eligibility.
Facts
William Nallan, Jr. was a member of Motion Picture Studio Mechanics Union, Local No. 52.
Nallan was elected by union members to a position on the executive board.
He received a minimal stipend as reimbursement for expenses related to the board’s monthly meetings, as ordered by the union’s bylaws.
Nallan rendered other services gratuitously.
He sustained a disabling incident, leading him to claim worker’s compensation benefits, alleging he was an employee of the union.
Procedural History
The Workmen’s Compensation Board initially ruled in favor of Nallan.
The Appellate Division affirmed the Board’s decision.
The Motion Picture Studio Mechanics Union, Local No. 52, appealed to the Court of Appeals of the State of New York.
Issue(s)
Whether a union member, elected to the executive board and receiving only expense reimbursement, is considered an employee of the union for the purposes of worker’s compensation benefits when there is no employment agreement, control of activities, or right to discharge.
Holding
No, because under the specific facts of this case, the claimant was not an employee of the union at the time of the disabling incident. There was no employment agreement, the union did not control his activities or have a right to discharge him from the board, nor were there any other indications of an employer-employee relationship.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals determined that the critical factor in establishing an employer-employee relationship was missing in this case. The court emphasized that simply being a member of the union and being elected to the executive board does not automatically create an employment relationship. The minimal stipend received was merely reimbursement for expenses, not compensation for services rendered as an employee. The absence of an employment agreement, coupled with the lack of control by the union over Nallan’s activities and the inability to discharge him, were determinative factors.
The court stated, “Under the instant facts it cannot be said that the respondent was an employee of the union at the time of the disabling incident. As a member of the union, he had been elected by the other union members to a position on the executive board but this certainly did not constitute employment. He received no compensation or salary for his functions as a board member other than a minimal stipend, ordered by the union’s by-laws, as reimbursement for expenses in connection with the board’s monthly meeting. The other services he rendered were gratuitous and intentionally so. There was no employment agreement between the appellant and the union. The union did not control his activities or have a right to discharge him from the board, nor were there any other indicia which would point to an employer-employee relationship.”
The decision underscores the importance of demonstrating control, an employment agreement, and the right of discharge when claiming an employer-employee relationship for worker’s compensation purposes, particularly in the context of union membership and voluntary service.