Pulka v. Edelman, 40 N.Y.2d 781 (1976)
A parking garage operator does not owe a duty of care to pedestrians injured by a patron driving a car out of the garage and onto an adjacent sidewalk.
Summary
The New York Court of Appeals held that a parking garage operator is not liable for injuries sustained by a pedestrian struck by a patron’s car exiting the garage. The Court reasoned that imposing such a duty would create an impractical and limitless burden on parking establishments, especially in densely populated areas. The duty to yield to pedestrians rests solely with the driver of the vehicle, as defined by the Vehicle and Traffic Law, and the garage lacks the requisite control over its patrons to be held responsible for their negligent acts off-premises.
Facts
The plaintiff, a pedestrian, was struck and injured by a car driven by a patron exiting a parking garage and crossing the sidewalk. The jury found the car’s driver 75% liable and the garage operator 25% liable. Evidence suggested patrons frequently drove out of the garage without stopping, but the garage did not take significant precautionary measures to prevent this.
Procedural History
The Civil Court of the City of New York initially rendered a verdict in favor of the plaintiff against the car’s owner and operator and the garage operators. The Trial Judge set aside the verdict against the garage. The Appellate Term reversed and reinstated the verdict against the garage. The Appellate Division affirmed the Appellate Term’s decision. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, reinstating the Civil Court’s initial judgment.
Issue(s)
Whether a parking garage operator owes a duty of care to pedestrians injured by the negligent driving of a patron exiting the garage onto an adjacent sidewalk.
Holding
No, because the duty to yield to pedestrians rests with the driver of the vehicle under the Vehicle and Traffic Law, and imposing a duty on the garage would create an impractical and boundless expansion of liability.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court emphasized that negligence requires a duty owed to the plaintiff. While the driver clearly had a duty to the pedestrian under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1173, no such statutory duty extended to the garage. The Court rejected the argument that the garage had a duty to control its patrons’ conduct for the protection of off-premises pedestrians, stating that the relationships that give rise to a duty to control another’s conduct (e.g., master-servant) did not exist between the garage and its patrons. The Court noted that even in situations where there is a duty to control another’s conduct, there must be a reasonable opportunity to exercise that control, which the garage lacked. Imposing a duty on the garage would be an unreasonable burden, especially considering the numerous parking facilities in urban areas. The Court stated, “Foreseeability should not be confused with duty. The principle expressed in Palsgraf v Long Is. R. R. Co. (248 NY 339, supra), quoted by the dissent, is applicable to determine the scope of duty—only after it has been determined that there is a duty. Since there is no duty here, that principle is inapplicable.” The Court further reasoned that the Legislature could have imposed specific requirements on garages to protect pedestrians but chose instead to place the duty on the driver. Expanding liability to the garage would be an unnecessary extension of negligence law, imposing responsibility where there is little expectation of preventing negligent conduct. The Court acknowledged the distinction between a moral duty and a legal duty, noting that “a person may have a moral duty to prevent injury to another, but no legal duty.”