New York Public Interest Research Group, Inc. v. Steingut, 40 N.Y.2d 250 (1976)
Legislative allowances for particular and additional services are considered “fixed by law” when provided through annual budgetary appropriations, and any increases or new allowances during a legislator’s term are unconstitutional, while decreases are not challenged.
Summary
This case addresses the constitutionality of legislative allowances in New York. Plaintiffs challenged the allowances for particular and additional services to legislators, arguing they violated the state constitution’s prohibition against increasing allowances during a legislator’s term. The Court of Appeals held that allowances fixed by annual budgetary appropriations are considered “fixed by law,” and any increases or new allowances during a legislator’s term are unconstitutional. The court emphasized the importance of respecting the legislative branch and the separation of powers, while also preventing conflicts of interest and manipulation of legislators’ votes.
Facts
The New York Public Interest Research Group (PIRG) and the Civil Service Employees Association (CSEA) challenged Chapter 460 of the Laws of 1975, which provided allowances for particular and additional services to members of the Legislature. PIRG argued that all such allowances were unconstitutional, while CSEA challenged increases in allowances for certain officers and new allowances for previously unauthorized legislative offices. These allowances were established through annual budgetary appropriations, a practice consistently followed since 1948. The plaintiffs argued that the annual nature of these appropriations meant no allowances were truly “fixed”, allowing for unconstitutional increases.
Procedural History
The trial court granted the plaintiffs all the relief sought. The Appellate Division modified the judgment, striking the provisions for restitution of overpayments and attorney fees in the PIRG action. All parties, except CSEA (regarding restitution), appealed to the Court of Appeals.
Issue(s)
Whether the allowances for particular and additional services to members of the Legislature, as included in Chapter 460 of the Laws of 1975, constitute unconstitutional increases prohibited by Section 6 of Article III of the State Constitution.
Holding
Yes, to the extent that individual allowances exceeded those allocated in the prior year (1974) or represented allowances for offices not previously included, because the allowances were “fixed by law” through annual budgetary appropriations, and the Constitution prohibits increases during a legislator’s term.
Court’s Reasoning
The court interpreted the word “fixed” in Section 6 of Article III, considering the objectives of the provision (preventing conflicts of interest and manipulation), historical practices, and the Legislature’s conduct since 1948. The court rejected the argument that allowances were not “fixed” because they were provided only by annual appropriations. It stated that “[n]othing in section 6 contemplates that because at the opening of any legislative year no allowance has then been ‘fixed by law’ for purposes of appropriation and payment, it must be deemed that no allowance has then been ‘fixed by law’ for purposes of determining whether there has been an increase or decrease within the scope of the constitutional proscription.”
The court recognized allowances provided by budgetary appropriation as “fixed by law” for the purpose of applying Section 6. It noted that these allowances establish a level against which subsequent appropriations are compared to determine if there has been a prohibited increase. The court emphasized that “Members shall continue to receive such salary and additional allowance as heretofore fixed and provided in this section, until changed by law pursuant to this section.”
The court concluded that allowances in Chapter 460 equal to those in 1974 were constitutional, but any exceeding those appropriations or representing new allowances were unconstitutional. The court declined to order restitution of unauthorized allowances, citing fairness and good faith reliance on the disbursements. They also upheld the deletion of attorney fees, citing the discretionary nature of such awards and the lack of evidence of a fund for payment.
The court explicitly stated: “[I]f the Legislature elects to continue its present practice of providing current allowances by annual appropriation legislation alone, the strictures of the Constitution mandate that such allowances be maintained at prior effective levels without increase, decrease or addition.” This underscores the importance of consistency when the legislature chooses to use annual appropriations.