Basso v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233 (1976)
New York has abolished the common-law distinctions between invitees, licensees, and trespassers, adopting a single standard of reasonable care for landowners to avoid foreseeable injury to others.
Summary
The New York Court of Appeals eliminated the traditional common-law classifications of entrants onto land (invitee, licensee, trespasser) for determining the landowner’s duty of care. Instead, the court adopted a single standard of reasonable care under the circumstances to prevent foreseeable injury. This decision shifted the focus from the entrant’s status to the landowner’s conduct and the foreseeability of harm. The plaintiff, injured while assisting in a rescue operation on the defendant’s land, was granted a new trial because the jury instructions incorrectly stated the duty owed to a licensee. The court held that the factfinder now must assess whether the landowner acted reasonably given all the circumstances.
Facts
Plaintiff Basso was injured while helping to search for a lost child on property owned by defendant Miller and Ice Caves Mountain, Inc. Basso, along with others, joined the search effort. While searching, Basso fell from a road or path on the property and sustained injuries. The road was used for access to the property and parking. Basso brought a negligence action against the landowners.
Procedural History
The trial court entered a judgment in favor of Basso. The Appellate Division affirmed. The case reached the New York Court of Appeals, which modified the Appellate Division’s order, ordering a new trial for defendant Ice Caves Mountain, Inc., based on incorrect jury instructions regarding the duty of care owed to a licensee.
Issue(s)
Whether New York should retain the common-law classifications of invitee, licensee, and trespasser in determining a landowner’s duty of care, or whether a single standard of reasonable care under the circumstances should be adopted.
Holding
No, the traditional distinctions are rejected because the court finds them confusing and potentially unfair. A single standard of reasonable care under the circumstances is adopted because it focuses on the foreseeability of harm and the landowner’s conduct, rather than the rigid classification of the entrant.
Court’s Reasoning
The court recognized the historical basis of the common-law classifications, stemming from an agrarian society where landowners had broad freedom to use their land. However, the court observed that societal values have evolved, and the emphasis should be on human safety and preventing foreseeable harm. The court found the common-law rules complex and often leading to arbitrary results. Quoting Kermarec v Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 631 (1959), the court noted that “the classifications are ‘at best, a fumbling attempt to separate those who are entitled to a greater measure of protection than others.’” The court concluded that a single standard of reasonable care allows for a more flexible and equitable approach, where the factfinder can consider all relevant circumstances, including the likelihood of injury, the seriousness of the potential injury, the burden of avoiding the risk, and the relationship of the parties. The court emphasized that foreseeability should be the primary factor in determining the landowner’s duty. Chief Judge Breitel concurred, arguing against abandoning the established rules and suggesting that the jury should not be delegated the responsibility to determine applicable social policy. He noted the potential for juries to be swayed by sympathy. Breitel suggested incremental reform of the existing classifications, particularly regarding the status of social guests. Nevertheless, the majority’s decision established a new precedent for premises liability in New York, moving away from status-based distinctions to a more comprehensive negligence analysis.