People v. Goldswer, 39 N.Y.2d 656 (1976)

A statute allowing a change of venue upon the prosecutor’s application due to reasonable cause to believe an impartial trial is impossible in the original county does not violate the defendant’s constitutional right to a jury from the district where the crime occurred.

Summary

The defendant, a former sheriff, was convicted in Warren County after the venue was changed from Schoharie County due to concerns about impartiality. The Special Prosecutor sought the change because the defendant, still in office, was accused of misusing his position. The New York Court of Appeals addressed the constitutionality of CPL 230.20(2), which allows the Appellate Division to change venue if a fair trial is unlikely in the original county. The court held the statute constitutional, finding it did not violate either the State or Federal Constitutions’ jury trial provisions, while cautioning against using venue changes to gain prosecutorial advantage.

Facts

The defendant, while Sheriff of Schoharie County, was indicted on 38 counts related to misusing his office, including using prisoners and personnel to construct his home and create campaign signs. Due to the District Attorney’s recusal, a Special Prosecutor was appointed. The prosecutor applied for a change of venue, arguing the defendant’s position as sheriff, the county’s small population, pre-trial publicity, and the sheriff’s office’s role in law enforcement and court security could inhibit jurors.

Procedural History

The Special Prosecutor’s motion for a change of venue was granted by the Appellate Division, Third Department. The case was moved to Warren County, where the defendant was convicted of 11 counts of official misconduct. The defendant appealed, arguing that the venue change violated his constitutional right to be tried by a jury from the county where the offenses occurred.

Issue(s)

1. Whether CPL 230.20(2) violates the New York State Constitution’s guarantee of trial by jury in cases where it has been constitutionally guaranteed.
2. Whether CPL 230.20(2) violates the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which guarantees the right to an impartial jury of the State and district where the crime occurred.

Holding

1. No, because prior to the adoption of the State Constitution, the legislature had the power to alter the common-law right to a jury trial in the county where the crime was committed.
2. No, because the Sixth Amendment’s vicinage requirement is a modified version of the common-law rule, allowing the legislature to define the “district” where the jury is drawn.

Court’s Reasoning

The court reasoned that while common law traditionally granted the accused the right to a jury from the vicinage (county where the crime occurred), this right was not absolute at the time of the State Constitution’s adoption. Legislative power to alter this right was recognized. The court cited Mack v. People, stating the Bill of Rights should be read “in the light of the law as it was when the bill of rights was adopted.”

Regarding the Sixth Amendment, the court referenced Williams v. Florida, noting that the framers did not intend to equate constitutional jury characteristics with common-law characteristics. The Sixth Amendment’s vicinage requirement is a compromise, protecting individuals from trial by alien bodies while allowing the government a forum when trial in the county is impractical. The court stated, “Under this expanded vicinage rule the individual is guaranteed a trial ‘by an impartial jury of the State and district’ where the crime was committed and the Legislature is given the power to define or designate the district.”

The court cautioned that CPL 230.20(2) should not be used to allow the prosecutor to seek a more favorable tribunal. There must be a reasonable basis to believe the original county is not neutral. The transferred venue should reflect the character of the original county, ensuring a fair trial without undue advantage for the prosecution. The court emphasized the importance of a neutral forum and cautioned against construing the statute to permit the prosecution to choose a more favorable tribunal. The court noted, “There must be some showing—at least a reasonable basis for belief— that the county in which the indictment is pending is not neutral between the parties because it is charged with an emotional atmosphere or some other factor which would preclude a fair and impartial trial and determination on the merits.”