People v. McLaurin, 43 N.Y.2d 770 (1977): Justification for a ‘Stop and Frisk’ Search

People v. McLaurin, 43 N.Y.2d 770 (1977)

After a lawful stop, a police officer must reasonably suspect that they are in danger of physical harm before conducting a search for weapons; the mere feeling of a “hard object” is insufficient justification.

Summary

The Court of Appeals reversed the defendant’s conviction for attempted criminal possession of a weapon, holding that the search which yielded the weapon (a blackjack) was unlawful. Police officers observed the defendant and two other men in a lobby, one of whom was holding a knife. After ordering the man with the knife to drop it, an officer saw the defendant take steps toward the door, said “hold it”, and touched a “hard object” in the defendant’s pocket. Without further inquiry, the officer searched the defendant and found the blackjack. The court found that the officer lacked the reasonable suspicion required to justify a search under CPL 140.50 because the officer did not articulate a fear for their safety and the “hard object” alone was insufficient basis for a search.

Facts

While on patrol in a high-crime area, Patrolman Martin and his partner saw three men in a building lobby. One man was holding a knife. The defendant and another man were leaning against the opposite wall. The officers entered the lobby and ordered the man with the knife to drop it, which he did. The defendant then began walking toward the door. Officer Martin said, “hold it,” and simultaneously touched a “hard object” in the defendant’s jacket pocket. The officer immediately searched the defendant and found a blackjack.

Procedural History

The defendant was convicted in the Criminal Court, Kings County, after a hearing on his motion to suppress the blackjack, which was denied. The Appellate Term affirmed the denial of the motion and the conviction. The case was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

Issue(s)

Whether, after a valid stop, a police officer has reasonable suspicion to conduct a search under CPL 140.50(3) based solely on feeling a “hard object” in the suspect’s pocket, without articulating a fear of physical harm or making further inquiry.

Holding

No, because the officer did not articulate a reasonable suspicion that he was in danger of physical injury as required by CPL 140.50(3), and the feeling of a “hard object” alone is insufficient to justify such a suspicion.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals emphasized that CPL 140.50 allows a search only when an officer “reasonably suspects that he is in danger of physical injury.” The court noted that Officer Martin did not testify that he believed he was in danger or that the “hard object” felt like a weapon. The court noted the defendant was not acting suspiciously and might have been a victim of the suspected robbery. The court stated that there was no “articulable foundation for the entrenchment upon individual liberty and privacy which a stop and frisk entails” (People v Johnson, 30 NY2d 929, 930). The court stated that the officer should have made a preliminary inquiry of the defendant as required by CPL 140.50(1). The court distinguished the case from situations where the police had information linking the defendant to a weapon or exigent circumstances justified the search. The court concluded that the officer could not point to any “particular facts” suggesting the defendant posed an imminent danger, citing People v Mack, 26 NY2d 311, 316-317 and Sibron v New York, 392 US 40, 64. The court implicitly held that the Fourth Amendment requires more than just a vague, generalized concern for safety; there must be specific, articulable facts that warrant the intrusion of a search. This case underscores the importance of officers being able to articulate a reasonable fear for their safety based on specific facts, not just a hunch or a vague feeling.