Victorson v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 37 N.Y.2d 395 (1975)
In strict products liability actions, the statute of limitations begins to run from the date of injury, not the date of sale, and the applicable period is that for personal injury and property damage actions (typically three years).
Summary
This case addresses when the statute of limitations begins to run in strict products liability claims. The Court of Appeals held that the statute of limitations begins to run at the time of injury, not at the time of sale. The court reasoned that strict products liability sounds in tort, not contract, and thus the tort statute of limitations applies. This decision overruled the prior holding in Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., aligning New York with the majority of jurisdictions on this issue. The court emphasized that fairness dictates that a cause of action should accrue when the injury is sustained, not before.
Facts
Three separate plaintiffs were injured by a defective centrifuge extractor manufactured and marketed by Bock Laundry Machine Company. The extractors were sold in 1948 (Victorson), 1959 (Rivera), and 1955 (Brown). The injuries occurred in 1969 (Victorson), 1967 (Rivera), and 1965 (Brown). The plaintiffs brought suit against Bock Laundry Machine Company based on strict products liability.
Procedural History
The cases reached the Appellate Division, which addressed procedural complexities to present the central question: when does the statute of limitations begin to run in a strict products liability case? The Appellate Division orders were appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.
Issue(s)
Whether, in a strict products liability action, the statute of limitations begins to run from the date of the sale of the defective product or from the date of injury sustained by the plaintiff.
Holding
Yes, the statute of limitations begins to run from the date of injury because strict products liability sounds in tort, and tort actions generally accrue at the time the injury is sustained.
Court’s Reasoning
The court reasoned that strict products liability is more akin to a tort than a contract claim. “The fundamental difference between tort and contract lies in the nature of the interests protected. Tort actions are created to protect the interest in freedom from various kinds of harm. The duties of conduct which give rise to them are imposed by the law, and are based primarily upon social policy, and not necessarily upon the will or intention of the parties.” The court emphasized that the plaintiffs had no prior relationship with the manufacturer, and the liability stems from social policy rather than any agreement. The court stated, “Rather than arising out of the ‘will or intention of the parties’, the liability imposed on the manufacturer under strict products liability, whether it be to purchaser, user, or innocent bystander, is predicated largely on considerations of sound social policy.” Therefore, because the cause of action accrues when the injury is sustained, the statute of limitations begins to run at that time. The court also considered policy arguments regarding fairness to manufacturers, but concluded that the difficulties faced by manufacturers in defending against old claims are counterbalanced by the plaintiff’s burden of proving the defect existed at the time the product left the manufacturer’s control. Finally, the Court stated, “[I]n applying the Statute of Limitations we look for the reality, and the essence of the action and not its mere name.” The court overruled its prior decision in Mendel, which had held that the statute of limitations ran from the date of sale, finding that the date of injury rule was more consistent with the nature of strict products liability and the prevailing view in other jurisdictions.