35 N.Y.2d 167 (1974)
Substantial compliance with Family Court Act § 724 regarding juvenile interrogations is sufficient when there is no evidence of prejudice to the juvenile and no indication of willful or negligent disregard of the statute.
Summary
Richard W. was arrested for violent crimes, identified by a victim, and taken to a precinct. Police notified his mother after administering Miranda warnings. He was questioned before his mother arrived, and then again with her present, resulting in a signed confession. The Family Court admitted the signed confession, leading to a finding that Richard committed acts constituting manslaughter, assault, and possession of a dangerous instrument, and he was committed to Elmira Reception Center. The Appellate Division reversed, finding a failure to comply with § 724. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that substantial compliance with the statute occurred, and there was no prejudice to the juvenile.
Facts
Richard W. was arrested with two others in connection with serious violent crimes. He and his companions were identified by one of their victims from a hospital bed. The arresting officers took Richard to the precinct station house. He was given pre-interrogation warnings per Miranda v. Arizona. His mother was notified, though not immediately. Richard was questioned before his mother arrived. After she arrived, the warnings were read again to both, and permission was sought to question Richard again in his mother’s presence. Both consented, and Richard made a further statement, reduced to writing and signed by both of them.
Procedural History
The Family Court suppressed testimony about Richard’s oral statements made before his mother’s arrival but admitted his signed written statement. The Family Court determined Richard committed acts that would constitute manslaughter, assault, and possession of a dangerous instrument if committed by an adult. He was committed to Elmira Reception Center. The Appellate Division reversed, finding insufficient compliance with Family Court Act § 724 regarding the written statement. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.
Issue(s)
1. Whether the failure to call the boy’s mother until arrival at the station house was a violation of the statutory mandate that “the peace officer shall immediately notify the parent” (§ 724, subd [a]).
2. Whether the station house to which respondent was taken was not “a facility designated by the appropriate appellate division of the supreme court as a suitable place for the questioning of children” (§ 724, subd [b], par [ii]).
3. Whether there was a failure to take respondent directly to Family Court as required by section 724 (subd [b], par [ii]).
Holding
1. No, because the call was made without undue delay, and there was reasonable justification for such delay as did occur.
2. No, because at the time of respondent’s arrest the Appellate Division had not yet designated any facility in the First Judicial Department suitable for the questioning of children.
3. No, because the statutory mandate that the child be taken to Family Court is made subject to the express exception, “unless the peace officer determines that it is necessary to question the child,” an exception evidently applicable in this case.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals reasoned that the irregularities, taken singly or together, did not require suppressing Richard’s signed statement. The Court found the call to the mother was made without undue delay and there was reasonable justification for the delay. Because the Appellate Division had not designated a suitable questioning facility at the time, precise compliance wasn’t possible. The requirement to take the child directly to Family Court has an exception for necessary questioning, applicable in this case.
The court emphasized substantial compliance and noted there was no evidence of prejudice or willful disregard of the statute. The court stated, “With respect to respondent’s later written statement, rather than intentional flouting of the statute there appears to have been conscientious observance, to the extent then possible, of respondent’s statutory and due process rights, the terms of the statute were substantially complied with, and there is no evidence in this record of prejudice or suggestion of significant prejudice to respondent.”
The court further reasoned that no useful prophylactic purpose would be served by penalizing the police for failing to conform to the statute literally, especially since there was no evidence of willful or negligent disregard of the statutory requirements. The court distinguished the facts from situations involving intentional disregard or a pattern of neglect.