People v. Harper, 37 N.Y.2d 96 (1975): Strict Compliance Required for Amending Accusatory Instruments

People v. Harper, 37 N.Y.2d 96 (1975)

Amendment of an accusatory instrument, such as an information, requires strict compliance with the procedures outlined in CPL 100.45(3), including pre-trial application, notice to the defendant, and an opportunity to be heard; a post-trial stipulation is insufficient.

Summary

Harper was charged with reckless endangerment, menacing, harassment, and weapons possession. The reckless endangerment charge was reduced, and the weapons charge was to be tried as a misdemeanor. Prior to trial, the District Attorney withdrew the reckless endangerment and weapon possession charges. After testimony, the trial judge believed two additional menacing counts involving police officers were also at issue based on an off-the-record stipulation. Harper was convicted of menacing the officers. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the information was not properly amended because CPL 100.45(3) requires specific procedures be followed for amending an accusatory instrument, which were not.

Facts

Harper was originally charged with: (1) reckless endangerment for allegedly pointing a pistol at police officers Goveia and Cresswell, (2) menacing Joyce Gordon, (3) harassment of Joyce Gordon, and (4) possession of a weapon.

Prior to trial, the prosecution reduced the reckless endangerment charge and moved to try the weapons charge as a misdemeanor, then withdrew both charges, leaving only the charges related to Joyce Gordon.

After the close of evidence, the trial court believed there were also two additional menacing counts against the police officers, based on an earlier off-the-record discussion and a later stipulation.

Harper was convicted of the two menacing counts against the police officers but acquitted of the other charges.

Procedural History

The case was tried in a lower court where Harper was convicted of menacing the police officers.

The Appellate Term upheld the conviction.

The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Term’s order, vacated the conviction, and dismissed the information.

Issue(s)

Whether an accusatory instrument, specifically an information, can be effectively amended to include additional charges after the commencement of a trial through a stipulation of counsel, when the statutory requirements for amendment under CPL 100.45(3) have not been met.

Holding

No, because CPL 100.45(3) provides the exclusive means for amending an accusatory instrument by adding a count, and that requires an application before trial, notice to the defendant, and an opportunity to be heard, none of which occurred here.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals emphasized that a valid accusatory instrument is a nonwaivable jurisdictional prerequisite for a criminal prosecution. Citing People v. McGuire, 5 NY2d 523, 527 and People v. Scott, 3 NY2d 148, 152.

The Court interpreted CPL 100.45(3), which dictates how an information can be amended: “At any time before the entry of a plea of guilty to or the commencement of a trial of an information, the court may, upon application of the people and with notice to the defendant and opportunity to be heard, order the amendment of the accusatory part of such information by addition of a count charging an offense supported by the allegations of the factual part of such information and/or any supporting depositions which may accompany it. In such case, the defendant must be accorded any reasonable adjournment necessitated by the amendment.”

The Court held that compliance with CPL 100.45(3) is mandatory for an effective amendment. A stipulation of counsel after the trial has commenced, even if it references a prior off-the-record discussion, does not satisfy the statute’s requirements. The Court stated, “We hold that amendment of an accusatory instrument within the scope of CPL 100.45 (subd 3) can be effectively accomplished only by compliance with the requirements of that subdivision.”

Because the procedural requirements of CPL 100.45(3) were not followed, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the menacing charges against the police officers. The conviction was therefore invalid.