People v. Nisoff, 36 N.Y.2d 560 (1975)
In the absence of a statutory requirement of corroboration, the scope of appellate review is limited to ascertaining whether the evidence against the accused is satisfactory under legal standards, especially when a child testifies.
Summary
The New York Court of Appeals affirmed a conviction for public lewdness, holding that the 10-year-old complainant’s sworn testimony was properly admitted and did not require corroboration. The court emphasized that corroboration is only required when mandated by statute or when the testimony is inherently suspect. The court found sufficient evidence to support the conviction, as the complainant’s testimony was clear and convincing and supported by other evidence placing the defendant at the scene. The court distinguished the case from prior cases where corroboration was required due to suspect testimony arising from matrimonial disputes.
Facts
On January 15, 1972, Claire Sullivan (10 years old) and her sister Helen (almost 8 years old) were walking when a car driven by Nisoff stopped. Nisoff asked for directions, then exposed himself and invited the girls to touch him. Claire identified Nisoff as the perpetrator. Helen did not see the exposure but confirmed Nisoff was the driver who asked for directions. A neighbor testified the girls left her house shortly before the incident. Another witness saw the girls near a parked car with one occupant.
Procedural History
Nisoff was convicted of public lewdness in the Justice Court of the Town of Queensbury, Warren County, following a jury trial. He appealed, challenging the admissibility of the children’s testimony and arguing that corroboration was required. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction.
Issue(s)
1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the 10-year-old complainant to give sworn testimony.
2. Whether the trial court erred by allowing the 8-year-old sister to give unsworn testimony.
3. Whether the crime of public lewdness requires corroboration of the complainant’s testimony, even though not explicitly mandated by statute.
Holding
1. No, because the trial court properly determined that the 10-year-old complainant understood the nature of an oath.
2. No, because the trial court properly determined that the 8-year-old sister possessed the requisite intelligence and capacity to give unsworn testimony.
3. No, because the court found sufficient evidence of a clear and convincing variety to support the conviction, distinguishing this case from those requiring corroboration due to inherently suspect testimony.
Court’s Reasoning
The court reasoned that CPL 60.20(2) allows the trial court discretion in determining whether a child under 12 is competent to give sworn testimony. The court emphasized that “the infant witness must not only demonstrate sufficient intelligence and capacity to justify the reception of his or her testimony, but it must also be clear that he knows, understands and appreciates the nature of an oath before the trial court may permit the reception of sworn testimony.” The trial court properly assessed the 10-year-old’s understanding of an oath and her ability to differentiate between truth and falsehood. As for the 8-year-old, the court found she had the capacity and intelligence to give unsworn testimony. The court further stated, quoting Wheeler v. United States, 159 U.S. 523, 524, “The decision of this question rests primarily with the trial judge… [and] will not be disturbed on review unless from that which is preserved it is clear that it was erroneous.”
Regarding the need for corroboration, the court noted that the common law did not require corroboration in offenses against the chastity of women. The court distinguished People v. Porcaro, 6 N.Y.2d 248 (1959), where the court found the uncorroborated testimony of a child insufficient due to the unique factual setting of a matrimonial dispute, making the testimony inherently suspect. The court stated, “in the absence of a statutory requirement of corroboration the scope of our review should be limited to ascertaining whether or not the evidence against the accused is otherwise satisfactory under legal standards.” Here, there was ample evidence to support the conviction including identification by both girls, corroboration of their presence at the scene by other witnesses and no indication that the testimony was inherently suspect. Unlike Porcaro, the testimony here did not arise from a matrimonial dispute.