Gleason v. Gleason, 45 N.Y.2d 96 (1978)

In a divorce action, a nominally successful party may appeal a modification that strikes one of the grounds for divorce if important rights may turn on the grounds upon which the judgment is based; furthermore, cruel and inhuman treatment can be sufficient grounds for divorce.

Summary

In this New York Court of Appeals case, the plaintiff was granted a divorce on two grounds: living apart after a separation judgment and cruel and inhuman treatment. The Appellate Division modified the judgment by removing the first ground but affirmed the divorce based on the second. The Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff could appeal the modification because important rights may turn on the grounds for divorce. It further agreed that the 1965 judgment was not a judgment of separation that could be used as grounds for divorce. Finally, the Court found sufficient evidence to support the lower courts’ conclusion of cruel and inhuman treatment, affirming the divorce.

Facts

The plaintiff was granted a judgment of divorce in Special Term. The judgment was based on two grounds: (1) the parties living apart for at least a year after a judgment in a separation action, per Domestic Relations Law § 170(5), and (2) cruel and inhuman treatment, per Domestic Relations Law § 170(1).

Procedural History

Special Term granted the plaintiff a divorce. The Appellate Division modified the judgment by striking the reference to the parties living apart after a judgment of separation and affirmed the judgment based on cruel and inhuman treatment. The plaintiff appealed the modification, and the defendant appealed the finding of cruel and inhuman treatment to the New York Court of Appeals.

Issue(s)

1. Whether the plaintiff was aggrieved by the Appellate Division’s modification, allowing her to appeal.
2. Whether the 1965 judgment was a judgment of separation upon which a divorce may be granted per Domestic Relations Law § 170(5).
3. Whether the defendant’s actions constituted cruel and inhuman treatment, satisfying Domestic Relations Law § 170(1).

Holding

1. Yes, because in a matrimonial action, a nominally successful party might be aggrieved when one of the grounds upon which a judgment is based is stricken, as important rights may turn on the grounds for divorce.
2. No, because the 1965 judgment was not a judgment of separation within the meaning of Domestic Relations Law § 170(5).
3. Yes, because the conclusion reached by both courts below that cruel and inhuman treatment had been sufficiently demonstrated was supported by the evidence.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals reasoned that while technically the plaintiff wasn’t deprived of the divorce, the removal of one of the grounds affected her rights. The court noted that in matrimonial actions, the grounds upon which a judgment is based can have practical implications. The court cited legal commentary and Diemer v. Diemer to support the idea that a nominally successful party can still be aggrieved by an appellate modification. On the merits of the first issue, the court agreed that the 1965 judgment did not qualify as a judgment of separation for the purposes of obtaining a divorce under Domestic Relations Law § 170(5). Regarding the defendant’s appeal, the Court of Appeals deferred to the lower courts’ findings on cruel and inhuman treatment, stating that it saw “no occasion to disturb the conclusion reached by both courts below that cruel and inhuman treatment has been sufficiently demonstrated to satisfy the requirement of subdivision (1) of section 170 of the Domestic Relations Law.” The court cited Hessen v. Hessen, which establishes the standard for proving cruel and inhuman treatment.