36 N.Y.2d 776 (1975)
Section 50-e of the General Municipal Law confers discretion on courts to allow late filing of a notice of claim on behalf of infants, even if the infancy isn’t the direct cause of the late filing, but this discretion does not extend to adult claimants in the same case.
Summary
Sally Sherman, individually and as guardian for her son Steven, sought leave to file a late notice of claim against the Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA). The notice was filed late due to attorney error, not the son’s infancy. The Court of Appeals held that while the statute technically requires a causal connection between infancy and late filing, precedent grants courts discretion to allow late filings for infants. However, this discretion doesn’t apply to the adult claimant (Sally Sherman) in the same action. Thus, the Court allowed the late filing for the son but not for the mother.
Facts
Sally Sherman, individually and as the natural guardian of her son, Steven Sherman, had a claim against the Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA). A notice of claim was required to be filed within 90 days. The claim was prepared and verified 40 days *before* the deadline. The attorney failed to file the notice of claim within the statutory period.
Procedural History
The case was initially heard at Special Term, which made a determination (unspecified in the provided text). The Appellate Division then issued an order. The Metropolitan Transit Authority appealed to the New York Court of Appeals from the Appellate Division’s order. The Court of Appeals modified the Appellate Division’s order.
Issue(s)
1. Whether Section 50-e of the General Municipal Law mandates a strict causal connection between the infancy of a claimant and the failure to file a timely notice of claim, precluding judicial discretion to allow late filing when the delay is due to attorney error.
2. Whether the precedent established in Murray v. City of New York applies to adult claimants seeking to file a late notice of claim alongside an infant claimant in the same action.
Holding
1. No, because the statute is read as conferring discretion on the courts, in line with established precedent, to sustain or deny grants of permission for late filing for infants.
2. No, because the Murray decision is not applicable to the late filing by the adult claimant.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals acknowledged that a literal interpretation of Section 50-e would require a causal connection between the claimant’s infancy and the failure to file on time. However, they emphasized the importance of long-standing precedent and the policy articulated in Matter of Murray v City of New York, which grants courts discretion in deciding whether to allow late filings for infants. The court stated that this statute must be interpreted as giving the discretion to the courts. Despite the fact that the delay was due to attorney error, not directly to the claimant’s infancy, the court upheld the Appellate Division’s decision to grant leave to serve a late notice of claim on behalf of the minor son, Steven Sherman.
However, the court distinguished the situation of the adult claimant, Sally Sherman. They found that the Murray decision did *not* extend to adult claimants. Therefore, the Court modified the Appellate Division’s decision to disallow the parent claimant leave to serve a late notice of claim on her own behalf.
The dissenting judge, Gabrielli, argued that the delay in filing was solely due to counsel’s failure and had no connection to the claimant’s infancy. The dissent cited Matter of Ostrander v City of Syracuse, stating that the relevant consideration is the claimant’s incapacities, not the lawyer’s. Because the notice of claim was prepared well before the deadline, the dissent found no basis for attributing the late filing to the claimant’s infancy. The dissent emphasized the need to read and interpret the statute as written, without judicial expansion based on equitable concerns, which should be addressed by the legislature. The dissent also cited Camarella v East Irondequoit School Bd., highlighting the harshness of section 50-e but acknowledging the court’s lack of power to substitute statutory requirements.