People v. Farinaro, 36 N.Y.2d 284 (1975)
There is no constitutional or statutory right to assigned counsel on appeal for traffic infraction convictions where the defendant no longer faces imprisonment.
Summary
The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether indigent defendants have a right to assigned counsel on appeal for traffic infraction convictions. In these consolidated cases, the defendants were convicted of traffic infractions and sought assigned counsel for their appeals. The Court held that neither the U.S. Constitution, the New York Constitution, nor state statutes mandate the assignment of counsel in such cases, especially when the defendant no longer faces imprisonment. The Court reasoned that traffic infractions are qualitatively different from criminal prosecutions where imprisonment is a potential outcome, distinguishing them from cases requiring counsel.
Facts
Defendants were convicted of traffic infractions in the trial court. In one case, the defendant pleaded guilty, and in the other two, the convictions followed trials. Each defendant had assigned counsel at the trial level. The defendants then sought to appeal their convictions and requested the assignment of counsel at public expense for the appeal.
Procedural History
The trial court convicted the defendants of traffic infractions. The defendants then appealed to the Appellate Term, arguing they were entitled to assigned counsel for the appeal. The Appellate Term denied their request. The cases then went before the New York Court of Appeals.
Issue(s)
Whether indigent defendants have a constitutional or statutory right to assigned counsel on appeal from a conviction for a traffic infraction, where the defendant no longer faces the possibility of imprisonment.
Holding
No, because there is no statutory or constitutional right to assigned counsel in traffic infraction prosecutions where the defendant no longer faces imprisonment.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Term’s orders, holding that there is no statutory right to assigned counsel in traffic infraction prosecutions under New York’s County Law § 722-a and CPL 170.10, subd. 3, par. (c). The Court relied on its prior holding in People v. Letterio, 16 N.Y.2d 307, which established that the New York State Constitution does not require assigning counsel in such prosecutions. The Court distinguished Argersinger v. Hamlin, which mandated counsel where a conviction could lead to imprisonment, noting that the defendants in these cases no longer faced imprisonment. The court stated, “It is not persuasive to extrapolate ‘equal protection reasoning to such abstract “rights to appeal” from convictions for traffic infractions, without any showing of merit or likelihood of merit. This is especially true where the defendant no longer faces any loss of liberty, but is only exposed to adverse ‘points’ in the event of future traffic infractions.” The Court reasoned that if a defendant had counsel at trial, they or their lawyer should be able to suggest any errors meriting appeal. The Court also noted the situation is “even more ludicrous” when a defendant pleads guilty and then tries to appeal. The court emphasized that the possibility of accumulating points on a driver’s license as a result of the infraction does not create a compelling equal protection argument for assigning counsel on appeal.