36 N.Y.2d 704 (1975)
A claim of denial of a speedy trial is not cognizable in a CPLR Article 78 proceeding seeking to prohibit a District Attorney and Supreme Court Justices from proceeding on an indictment; however, a double jeopardy claim may be raised in such a proceeding.
Summary
Agnes Scranton sought to prohibit the District Attorney and Justices of the Supreme Court from proceeding with her indictment, arguing she was denied a speedy trial and that further prosecution would constitute double jeopardy. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s judgment denying her petition. It held that a speedy trial claim is not reviewable via an Article 78 proceeding, but a double jeopardy claim is. However, it found that Scranton was not placed in jeopardy because a mistrial was declared after only three jurors were sworn in, and thus, CPL 40.30(1)(b) was not violated.
Facts
Agnes Scranton was indicted, and a trial commenced. After three jurors were sworn in, a mistrial was declared. Scranton then brought an Article 78 proceeding, seeking to prevent the District Attorney and Justices of the Supreme Court from proceeding with the indictment against her. She argued that her right to a speedy trial had been violated and that a subsequent trial would constitute double jeopardy.
Procedural History
Scranton initiated an Article 78 proceeding against the Supreme Court and the District Attorney. The Appellate Division rendered a judgment, which was appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s judgment.
Issue(s)
1. Whether a claim of denial of a speedy trial is cognizable in an Article 78 proceeding seeking to prohibit the District Attorney and Justices of the Supreme Court from proceeding on an indictment.
2. Whether a claim of double jeopardy may be raised in a prohibition proceeding under CPLR Article 78.
3. Whether the petitioner was placed in jeopardy when a mistrial was declared after three jurors had been sworn.
Holding
1. No, because prior decisions have established that Article 78 proceedings are not the proper vehicle for raising speedy trial claims.
2. Yes, because previous cases have recognized the availability of prohibition proceedings for double jeopardy claims.
3. No, because under CPL 40.30(1)(b), a person is not deemed to have been prosecuted unless the trial proceeds to the point of swearing in all jurors.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals relied on precedent, citing Matter of Watts v. Supreme Ct. of State of N. Y., 28 Y 2d 714, Matter of Lee v. County Ct. of Erie County, 27 Y 2d 432, 437, and Matter of Blake v. Hogan, 25 Y 2d 747, to support its holding that a speedy trial claim is not cognizable in an Article 78 proceeding. Regarding the double jeopardy claim, the court acknowledged that such claims could be raised in a prohibition proceeding, citing Matter of State of New York v. King, 36 Y 2d 59, at p. 64; Matter of Kraemer v. County Ct. of Suffolk County, 6 Y 2d 363. However, the court found that Scranton had not been placed in jeopardy because CPL 40.30(1)(b) specifies that a person is not considered to have been prosecuted for double jeopardy purposes unless the trial proceeds to the point of swearing in all the jurors. Since only three jurors had been sworn in when the mistrial was declared, Scranton was not placed in jeopardy. The court stated: “The petitioner was not placed in jeopardy despite the fact that three jurors had been sworn before a mistrial was declared. (CPL 40.30, subd. 1, par. [b].)” The decision emphasizes the statutory requirement for double jeopardy to attach. This case provides practical guidance on the appropriate procedural vehicle for raising speedy trial and double jeopardy claims in New York and clarifies the point at which jeopardy attaches under CPL 40.30(1)(b).