People v. Cantor, 369 N.Y.S.2d 107 (1975): Limits on Police Power to Stop and Inquire

People v. Cantor, 369 N.Y.S.2d 107 (1975)

The common-law right of a police officer to inquire does not include the right to unlawfully seize an individual; a seizure requires reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.

Summary

Cantor was convicted of attempted possession of a weapon. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the police unlawfully seized Cantor when they encircled him with their car and persons, lacking reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The court reasoned that this seizure violated Cantor’s Fourth Amendment rights, rendering the subsequent discovery of the weapon inadmissible. This case clarifies that police investigative powers are limited by constitutional protections against unreasonable seizure, requiring at least a founded suspicion of criminal activity before a person can be detained.

Facts

Plainclothes officers observed Cantor and a companion smoking what they believed to be marijuana in Brooklyn. The officers followed Cantor to his home in Queens. After Cantor parked, the officers blocked his car with their unmarked vehicle and approached him from multiple directions. Before the officers identified themselves, Cantor allegedly removed a pistol from his back pocket and pointed it at the officers. The officers then identified themselves, ordered Cantor to freeze, and seized the pistol, subsequently arresting him after he admitted to not having a permit. A search revealed barbiturates and marijuana on Cantor’s person and marijuana residue in his car.

Procedural History

Cantor was charged with possession of weapons as a felony and reckless endangerment. He moved to suppress the evidence, arguing his constitutional rights were violated. The trial court denied the motion, finding that Cantor voluntarily produced the weapon. Cantor then pleaded guilty to attempted possession of a weapon. He appealed, arguing the stop and search were unlawful. The appellate division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the appellate division and dismissed the accusatory instruments.

Issue(s)

Whether the police action of encircling Cantor’s car and approaching him in a non-identified manner constituted an unlawful seizure under the Fourth Amendment, requiring suppression of the evidence subsequently obtained.

Holding

Yes, because Cantor was effectively seized when the police surrounded him and his vehicle, significantly interrupting his freedom of movement, and this seizure was not justified by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.

Court’s Reasoning

The court reasoned that a seizure occurs when an individual’s liberty of movement is significantly interrupted by police action. In this case, Cantor was seized when he was surrounded by officers and his car was blocked, preventing him from leaving. The court emphasized that constitutional protections apply regardless of whether the individual knows they are being accosted by police officers. The court stated, “Whenever a street encounter amounts to a seizure it must pass constitutional muster.”

The court distinguished between the stop-and-frisk law (CPL 140.50) and the common-law power to inquire, noting that both are limited by constitutional protections. A lawful detention requires a founded suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. The court found that the police lacked reasonable suspicion to stop Cantor, as their observations were remote and unreliable, and they had no independent knowledge of criminal activity. “The minimum requirement for a lawful detention stop is a founded suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.”

Because the initial seizure was unlawful, the subsequent discovery of the pistol was deemed a fruit of the poisonous tree and thus inadmissible. The court concluded that the police action exceeded permissible bounds because there was no justification for surrounding Cantor in a manner constituting a seizure.