Holodook v. Spencer, 36 N.Y.2d 32 (1974)
A parent’s negligent failure to supervise a child is not a tort actionable by the child in New York.
Summary
The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a child has a legally cognizable claim against a parent for negligent supervision. The court consolidated three cases raising similar issues. It held that a child does not have a cause of action against a parent for negligent supervision, primarily due to concerns about family harmony and the potential for undermining a child’s recovery against third parties through contribution claims against the parent. Allowing such claims would invite excessive judicial intrusion into family dynamics and potentially reduce compensation available to the injured child.
Facts
* Graney v. Graney: A four-year-old fell from a high slide in a playground; the child sued his father for inadequate supervision.
* Ryan v. Fahey: A three-year-old’s hand was run over by a lawnmower operated by a neighbor’s child; the child sued his mother for failing to supervise him.
* Holodook v. Spencer: A four-year-old darted between parked cars and was struck by a car. The driver brought a third-party action against the child’s mother for negligent supervision.
Procedural History
* In Graney, the lower court dismissed the complaint, and the Appellate Division affirmed.
* In Ryan, Special Term denied the mother’s motion to dismiss, but the Appellate Division reversed.
* In Holodook, Special Term denied the parents’ motion to dismiss the third-party complaint. The Appellate Division reversed, dismissing the claim against the parents.
* All cases were appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.
Issue(s)
1. Whether a parent owes a legal duty to a child giving rise to an action for damages for negligent supervision.
2. Whether damages may be apportioned between a parent who failed to adequately supervise a child and a third party who injured the child, without violating General Obligations Law § 3-111.
Holding
1. No, because recognizing such a duty would unduly interfere with family relations and could reduce the child’s compensation through third-party contribution claims against the parent.
2. N/A, as there is no underlying cause of action for negligent supervision.
Court’s Reasoning
The court reasoned that while Gelbman v. Gelbman abrogated intrafamilial immunity for non-willful torts, it did not create new liabilities based on the family relationship itself. Recognizing a cause of action for negligent supervision would open the door to excessive litigation against parents. “Indeed, if within the wide scope of daily experiences common to the upbringing of a child a parent may be subjected to a suit for damages for each failure to exercise care commensurate with the risk… a new and heavy burden will be added to parenthood.” The court expressed concern about the impact of Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., which allowed for apportionment among joint tortfeasors, as it could lead to third parties seeking contribution from parents for negligent supervision, potentially diminishing the child’s recovery. The court highlighted General Obligations Law § 3-111, which prevents imputing parental negligence to a child, arguing that allowing contribution claims would create a loophole in this protection. The court also noted the difficulty in defining the scope of a parent’s duty to supervise and the potential for retaliatory suits between estranged parents. While acknowledging that some states recognize a duty to supervise, the court emphasized the importance of parental discretion in raising children. The court quoted Cannon v. Cannon, stating, “Indeed, if within the wide scope of daily experiences common to the upbringing of a child a parent may be subjected to a suit for damages for each failure to exercise care commensurate with the risk—for each injury caused by inattention, unwise choice or even selfishness—a new and heavy burden will be added to parenthood.” It concluded that the mutual obligations within a family should derive from natural instinct and love, not legal coercion. Since there is no primary cause of action, there can be no claim for contribution.