People v. Glucksman, 30 N.Y.2d 341 (1972)
The rule in Garrity v. New Jersey, which protects public employees from compelled self-incrimination under threat of job loss, does not apply if a court determines the employee’s testimony and waiver of immunity were voluntary.
Summary
Glucksman, an Assistant Attorney-General under criminal investigation for attempted extortion, voluntarily appeared before the District Attorney and Grand Jury, waiving his immunity. He was later indicted and moved to suppress his Grand Jury testimony based on Garrity v. New Jersey, arguing his testimony was compelled under threat of losing his job. The trial court found his appearance and waiver were voluntary. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Garrity does not create a per se rule and that the protection against compelled testimony does not apply when the employee’s actions are determined to be voluntary. This case carves out an exception to the Garrity rule where voluntariness is clearly established.
Facts
The defendant, an Assistant Attorney-General, was under criminal investigation for attempted extortion.
He voluntarily went to the District Attorney’s office and disclosed information, claiming to present the true facts of the case.
He requested to appear before the Grand Jury.
He initiated a phone call to an Assistant District Attorney, which led to his Grand Jury appearance.
He signed a waiver of immunity before testifying to the Grand Jury.
Procedural History
Defendant was indicted and arraigned.
He moved to suppress his Grand Jury testimony and dismiss the indictment, citing Garrity v. New Jersey.
The Supreme Court (trial court) held a hearing and denied the motion, finding his appearance and waiver of immunity were voluntary.
The Appellate Division affirmed this finding.
The case was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.
Issue(s)
Whether the rule announced in Garrity v. New Jersey, that testimony of a public employee compelled under a forfeiture-of-office statute is inadmissible, is a per se rule.
Whether the Garrity rule is inapplicable if the element of coercion is explicitly eliminated by a factual determination of voluntariness on the part of the particular public employee.
Holding
No, the Garrity rule is not a per se rule because the Supreme Court acknowledged a distinction for situations where an individual volunteers information.
Yes, the Garrity rule is inapplicable if there is a factual determination that the public employee’s appearance and waiver were both voluntary because the element of coercion that Garrity seeks to prevent is absent.
Court’s Reasoning
The court distinguished this case from Garrity v. New Jersey, emphasizing the trial court’s factual finding, affirmed by the Appellate Division, that Glucksman’s appearance before the Grand Jury and his waiver of immunity were voluntary. The court stated that there was clear evidence to support the lower court’s finding that “the defendant Glucksman appeared before the Grand Jury without being subpoenaed and testified of his own volition… Neither coercion nor duress compelled his appearance. The threat or apprenhension that he would forfeit his official position was not the reason for his testifying or his executing a waiver of immunity.”
The Court of Appeals relied on the Supreme Court’s own language in Garrity, noting the exception for “the situation where one who is anxious to make a clean breast of the whole affair volunteers the information.” This exception was also recognized in Lefkowitz v. Turley.
The court concluded that because the lower court made a specific finding of voluntariness, the Garrity rule, designed to protect against coerced testimony, did not apply. The court essentially created a ‘voluntariness exception’ to the Garrity rule. If a public employee’s waiver of immunity and testimony is voluntary, it can be admissible despite the potential for coercion inherent in their position.