Anderson v. New York Telephone Co., 35 N.Y.2d 746 (1974): Telephone Company’s Liability for Subscriber’s Defamatory Messages

Anderson v. New York Telephone Co., 35 N.Y.2d 746 (1974)

A telephone company is not liable for defamatory messages transmitted by a subscriber using its equipment, even if the company has notice of the content of the messages, because the company acts as a passive conduit and does not “publish” the defamatory material.

Summary

This case addresses whether a telephone company can be held liable for defamatory messages recorded and disseminated by one of its subscribers using equipment leased from the company. The plaintiff, a Bishop, sued the New York Telephone Company after a subscriber broadcasted defamatory accusations about him via recorded telephone messages. The Court of Appeals held that the telephone company was not liable, reasoning that it did not “publish” the defamatory material. The court likened the telephone company’s role to that of a passive conduit, similar to a company that leases typewriters or photocopy machines, and emphasized the company’s obligations as a public utility to provide service without censoring legal content.

Facts

Plaintiff was a Presiding Bishop. Defendant leased equipment to Donald L. Jackson, who broadcasted defamatory messages about the plaintiff through recorded telephone messages. Callers would hear accusations against plaintiff, including claims of illegitimate children. Plaintiff informed the phone company about the defamatory messages and provided proof that these claims were unfounded. The phone company’s area manager indicated he would try to get Jackson to terminate the recordings, but the messages continued, with Jackson adding further allegations.

Procedural History

Plaintiff sued the New York Telephone Company for defamation. The defendant moved for dismissal, arguing that the complaint failed to state a cause of action. Special Term initially focused on qualified privilege, ruling a factual question existed. Following a trial, the court granted judgment for the defendant, specifically finding that the New York Telephone Company did not publish the scandalous material. The Appellate Division reversed, ordering a new trial, focusing on the phone company’s potential reckless disregard. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, reinstating the original judgment dismissing the complaints.

Issue(s)

Whether a telephone company, by providing equipment used to transmit defamatory messages, can be considered to have “published” the defamatory material and thus be liable for defamation, even when it has notice of the content of those messages.

Holding

No, because in order to be deemed to have published a libel a defendant must have had a direct hand in disseminating the material whether authored by another, or not. The telephone company’s role is merely passive and no different from any company which leases equipment to another for the latter’s use.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals reasoned that a telephone company is a public utility with an obligation to provide service for legal uses. It cannot be considered a publisher of defamatory material simply because its equipment is used to transmit such material. The court distinguished the telephone company’s role from that of media outlets with editorial functions, such as newspapers or telegraph companies (where employees actively aid in the transmission of messages). The telephone company’s role is passive, similar to a company leasing typewriters or photocopy machines, which would not be liable for libelous content produced using their equipment. The court stated that: “He who furnishes the means of convenient circulation, knowing, of having reasonable cause to believe, that it is to be used for that purpose, if it is in fact so used, is guilty of aiding in the publication and becomes the instrument of the libeler” does not apply to telephone companies. The court emphasized that imposing liability on the phone company would create an undue burden, requiring them to censor content and potentially violating subscribers’ rights. The Court concluded that Jackson published the libel and the equipment from defendant did not change that.