People v. Selikoff, 35 N.Y.2d 227 (1974)
A sentencing court is not bound by a prior sentence promise made during plea negotiations if later information, such as a presentence report, reveals facts that render the promised sentence inappropriate, provided the defendant is given the opportunity to withdraw the plea.
Summary
This case addresses the enforceability of plea bargains when a sentencing court later finds the agreed-upon sentence to be inappropriate. The New York Court of Appeals held that a judge is not bound by a preliminary sentencing promise if new information reveals the promise to be unsuitable. However, the defendant must be given the opportunity to withdraw the guilty plea. The court emphasized that plea bargaining serves essential functions in the criminal justice system, but judicial discretion in sentencing must be maintained, and off-the-record promises are disfavored. The integrity of the plea bargaining process is paramount, requiring transparency and judicial oversight.
Facts
In People v. Selikoff, the defendant pleaded guilty to grand larceny and obscenity based on a preliminary understanding that no imprisonment would be imposed. Subsequently, the judge presided over the trial of Selikoff’s co-defendants and gained new information suggesting Selikoff was a principal participant in the crime, rather than a peripheral one as initially believed. Additionally, the presentence report indicated Selikoff denied guilt. The judge then determined he could not honor the initial sentencing promise.
In People v. Campbell, the prosecutor made an off-the-record promise that the People would not oppose a motion to withdraw the plea if a prison sentence were imposed. This promise was not disclosed to the court. The defendant then stated on the record that the only promise was that the People would recommend a fine or probation. The court sentenced Campbell to three months’ imprisonment, and the prosecutor informed the court of the prior agreement.
In People v. Davidson, before pleading guilty, the court told the defendant that, contingent upon the presentence report, the sentence would be no greater than 3 to 10 years. The defendant stated that no other promises had been made. After sentencing, the defendant claimed the judge made an off-the-record promise that the sentence would be no more than four years.
Procedural History
Selikoff: The Westchester County Court sentenced the defendant to an indeterminate five-year sentence on the grand larceny charge and a $1,000 fine on the obscenity charge after he refused to withdraw his plea. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions.
Campbell: The New York City Criminal Court sentenced the defendant to a term of three months. The Appellate Term unanimously affirmed the conviction.
Davidson: The New York County court sentenced the defendant to a term of 3 to 10 years. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The defendant twice unsuccessfully sought postconviction relief.
Issue(s)
1. Whether a defendant can enforce a sentence promise made during plea negotiations when later information reveals that the promised sentence is inappropriate.
2. Whether a defendant is entitled to specific performance of a plea agreement (i.e., the promised sentence) or only to the opportunity to withdraw the guilty plea if the court cannot or will not impose the promised sentence.
3. Whether an undisclosed, off-the-record promise made by a prosecutor can invalidate a guilty plea, especially when the defendant denies the existence of any other promises during the plea colloquy.
Holding
1. No, because a sentence promise at the time of plea is, as a matter of law and strong public policy, conditioned upon its being lawful and appropriate in light of the subsequent presentence report or information obtained from other reliable sources.
2. The defendant is entitled to the opportunity to withdraw the guilty plea, but not necessarily to specific performance of the promised sentence, because the choice rests in the discretion of the sentencing court.
3. No, because the court relied, and had a right to rely, on the record, which contradicts the contention that the plea was induced by the off-the-record promise, and because the prosecutor does not have the authority to promise that a defendant may withdraw a plea if a prison sentence is to be imposed.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court reasoned that plea negotiations serve multiple needs, including relieving court congestion, avoiding the risks of trial, and enabling individualized sentences. However, these benefits must be balanced against the need for judicial discretion in sentencing. The Court emphasized the importance of presentence reports (CPL 390.20, subd. 1), stating that a judge may not ignore provisions of law designed to ensure an appropriate sentence is imposed. “Thus, any sentence ‘promise’ at the time of plea is, as a matter of law and strong public policy, conditioned upon its being lawful and appropriate in light of the subsequent presentence report or information obtained from other reliable sources.”
The Court rejected applying commercial contract law to plea negotiations, citing the strong public policy of rehabilitation and social protection. The Court found the defendant in Selikoff was afforded an opportunity to withdraw his plea, which satisfied the requirements. The Court distinguished Santobello v. New York, stating that it did not indicate a preference for fulfilling a broken promise over allowing withdrawal of the plea; the choice rests within the sentencing court’s discretion.
Regarding Campbell, the Court emphasized that the prosecutor’s off-the-record promise to allow withdrawal of the plea was unenforceable because the prosecutor lacks the power to grant such a withdrawal; that power rests solely with the court (CPL 220.60, subd. 4). Furthermore, the defendant had explicitly denied that any other promises had been made, misleading the court.
Regarding Davidson, the court’s reasoning rested on the credibility of the record: