Rosman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 34 N.Y.2d 385 (1974)
Under the Warsaw Convention, an airline carrier is liable for a passenger’s palpable, objective bodily injuries, including those caused by psychic trauma resulting from an accident, and for the damages flowing from those bodily injuries, but not for the psychic trauma itself without physical manifestation.
Summary
Passengers on a hijacked flight sued Trans World Airlines (TWA) seeking damages for psychic trauma suffered during the hijacking, relying on Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention. The New York Court of Appeals held that while the Warsaw Convention allows for recovery for physical injuries caused by psychic trauma, it does not permit recovery for purely mental injuries without physical manifestation. The court emphasized the importance of interpreting the treaty to promote uniformity in international air travel and adhering to the ordinary meaning of the term “bodily injury.”
Facts
Plaintiffs were passengers on a TWA flight hijacked en route from Tel Aviv to New York. The hijackers, members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, diverted the plane to Jordan, where the passengers were held captive for six days. The passengers experienced fear for their lives and personal safety. Additionally, they endured physical discomforts such as confinement to their seats, extreme temperatures, and inadequate food and water. Some plaintiffs claimed to have developed physical ailments like backaches, skin rashes, weight loss, and dehydration, allegedly exacerbated by the emotional distress.
Procedural History
The plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on the issue of liability. Special Term granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs, but the Appellate Divisions reversed, finding triable issues of fact regarding the meaning of the French text of Article 17. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal to resolve this dispute.
Issue(s)
Whether the term “bodily injury” in Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention encompasses purely psychic trauma, allowing for recovery of damages in the absence of any physical manifestation of injury.
Holding
No, because the ordinary meaning of “bodily injury” in Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention connotes a palpable, conspicuous physical injury and excludes mental injury with no observable bodily manifestations. The carrier is liable only for objective bodily injuries, including those caused by psychic trauma, and for the damages flowing from those bodily injuries. The trauma itself without physical injury is not compensable.
Court’s Reasoning
The court determined that the meaning of the Warsaw Convention’s terms is a question of law, not fact, for the court to decide. While the treaty is written in French, the court stated that where an accurate English translation is agreed upon, the court should determine the ordinary meaning of those terms. The court rejected the argument that French law should govern the interpretation of the treaty’s terms. The court emphasized that the primary objective of the Warsaw Convention is uniformity among its signatory nations. The court analyzed the term “bodily injury,” noting that in its ordinary usage, it suggests a distinction from “mental” injury. The court found the inclusion of the word “bodily” significant. The court stated, “In our view, therefore, the ordinary, natural meaning of ‘bodily injury’ as used in article 17 connotes palpable, conspicuous physical injury, and excludes mental injury with no observable ‘bodily’, as distinguished from ‘behavioral’, manifestations.” The court reasoned that allowing recovery for purely psychic trauma would undermine the goal of uniformity and deviate from the treaty’s plain language. It held that a causal link between the accident (hijacking) and a resulting objective bodily injury is required for recovery under Article 17. The court stated, “A claim for damages under article 17 arises ‘in the event of * * * bodily injury’. The claim must therefore be predicated upon some objective identifiable injury to the body. In addition, there must be some causal connection between the bodily injury and the ‘accident’.” However, once the predicate of liability – the bodily injury – is established, damages sustained as a result of the bodily injury are compensable, including mental suffering. The court quoted Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U. S. 332, 342 stating that the treaty may be afforded a liberal interpretation which tends to support the rights which plaintiffs claim under it.