People v. Miller, 35 N.Y.2d 337 (1974)

When a defendant invokes the Agreement on Detainers and is returned to their original place of imprisonment before trial without a showing of impossibility in bringing the defendant to trial, the indictment must be dismissed with prejudice if the trial does not occur within the statutory timeframe.

Summary

Leonard Miller, serving a federal sentence in Virginia, was indicted in New York. He invoked his right to a speedy trial under the Agreement on Detainers. He was brought to New York but returned to Virginia without trial because his case was not reached due to court scheduling policies. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the indictment. The court reasoned that the 10-month delay exceeded the 180-day limit under the Agreement, and the prosecution failed to demonstrate it was impossible to bring Miller to trial while he was in Buffalo, thus warranting dismissal with prejudice.

Facts

1. Leonard Miller was indicted on January 29, 1969, while serving a federal sentence in Virginia.
2. In April 1969, Miller and his counsel asserted his right to a speedy trial, invoking the Agreement on Detainers.
3. Miller was brought to Buffalo on June 5, 1969, for trial.
4. He was held in Buffalo for 24 days and then returned to Virginia without a trial.
5. The reason for the return was that Miller’s case was not reached in June and would not be reached in July due to Erie County Court policy of only hearing cases of defendants incarcerated for Erie County crimes during July.
6. On December 10, 1969, Miller successfully moved to dismiss the indictment under the Agreement on Detainers.

Procedural History

1. The Erie County Court granted Miller’s motion to dismiss the indictment.
2. The appellate division affirmed the lower court’s decision.
3. The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the appellate decision.

Issue(s)

1. Whether the return of a defendant to their original place of imprisonment before trial, after invoking the Agreement on Detainers, requires dismissal of the indictment when the trial does not occur within 180 days, as prescribed by the agreement?

Holding

1. Yes, because the Agreement on Detainers mandates that a defendant be brought to trial within 180 days of their request, and if returned to their original place of imprisonment before trial, the indictment must be dismissed with prejudice, especially when the prosecution fails to demonstrate the impossibility of bringing the defendant to trial within the prescribed timeframe.

Court’s Reasoning

The court based its reasoning on the Agreement on Detainers (Code Crim. Pro., § 669-b; CPL 580.20), which stipulates that a defendant must be brought to trial within 180 days of requesting it. The court emphasized that if a defendant is returned to their original place of imprisonment before trial, the court must dismiss the indictment with prejudice. Despite the United States not being a party to the agreement at the time, the court found that all parties acted in accordance with its provisions.

The court acknowledged that a 10-month delay does not automatically warrant dismissal in every case, and that the length of delay is one of several factors to consider. However, the delay significantly exceeded the 180 days allowed under the Agreement on Detainers. The court noted the reduced opportunity for a concurrent sentence as a significant consequence of the delay. The court further stated that while court congestion and rules of precedence are cognizable factors, they are limited by the nature of the speedy trial guarantee. The court found critical that the District Attorney made no attempt to show that it was impossible to bring Miller to trial while he was incarcerated in Buffalo.

The court referenced People v. Blakley, 34 N.Y.2d 311, and Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, emphasizing that the defendant and his counsel did assert the speedy trial right.

The court explicitly stated, regarding the Agreement on Detainers, that if, as here, the defendant is returned to his original place of imprisonment before a trial is obtained, “ the court shall enter an order dismissing [the indictment] with prejudice.” (Code Crim. Pro., § 669-b; CPL 580.20, art. Ill, subds. [a], [d].)