People v. Eboli, 34 N.Y.2d 281 (1974)
When criminal statutes overlap, allowing for prosecutorial discretion in charging, such discretion is permissible absent evidence of discriminatory application or legislative intent to the contrary.
Summary
Defendants Eboli and Caccavale were convicted of attempted coercion, conspiracy, and assault. They argued that the coercion statute was unconstitutional because it allowed prosecutors to choose between a felony and a misdemeanor charge based on identical elements. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, holding that prosecutorial discretion in choosing between overlapping statutes is permissible absent evidence of discriminatory application. The court reasoned that the legislature likely intended the felony charge to apply in most cases involving threats of physical injury or property damage, and that prosecutorial discretion is an inherent part of the criminal justice system.
Facts
Eboli and Caccavale attempted to coerce Nicholas Travato into making them his business partners in a bar he operated. Caccavale assaulted Travato with a bar stool and pounded his head onto a cement floor. Eboli assaulted a friend of Travato. These events occurred after Travato refused to partner with the defendants.
Procedural History
Eboli and Caccavale were convicted of attempted coercion in the first degree, conspiracy in the third degree, and three counts of assault in the third degree in the trial court. The defendants appealed, arguing that the coercion statute was unconstitutional. The appellate court affirmed the convictions, and the case was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.
Issue(s)
Whether a criminal statute that defines a felony and a misdemeanor with identical elements violates constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection by granting excessive discretion to the prosecutor.
Holding
No, because overlapping in criminal statutes, and the opportunity for prosecutorial choice they represent, is no bar to prosecution unless there is evidence of legislative intent to the contrary or unlawful discrimination.
Court’s Reasoning
The court recognized that the statutes defining coercion in the first and second degrees were nearly identical when the coercion involved threats of physical injury or property damage. However, the court looked to the Practice Commentaries accompanying the statutes, which suggested that the felony coercion statute was intended to apply whenever the method of coercion was to instill a fear of injury to a person or damage to property. The misdemeanor offense was intended as a “safety-valve” for unusual factual situations lacking the heinous quality associated with such threats.
The court relied on prior holdings that overlapping criminal statutes and the prosecutorial choice they represent are permissible. The court reasoned that it is impossible to fashion statutory definitions that will not overlap under certain circumstances, and a decision must be made post facto as to which statute is most appropriate. Citing People v. Lubow, the court noted that even when the statutory definition of a misdemeanor embraces the elements of a lesser included violation, prosecution for the higher crime is permissible.
The court acknowledged judicial authority supporting the appellants’ argument but cited the majority of courts that have upheld prosecutorial discretion in choosing one of several applicable statutes. Quoting Hutcherson v. United States, the court stated, “A defendant has no constitutional right to elect which of two applicable statutes shall be the basis of his indictment and prosecution.”
The court recognized the inevitability of prosecutorial discretion and the practical difficulty of eliminating all statutory overlap. While acknowledging that the overlap in the coercion statutes could have been narrowed, the court emphasized that even under precise standards, the prosecutor retains the power to drop a charge entirely. The court concluded that society relies on the good judgment of prosecuting attorneys to charge crimes fairly and that this reliance does not, on its face, violate constitutional guarantees.