Matter of Kleinman v. McCoy, 30 N.Y.2d 130 (1972): Determining Appointing Authority Under Court Unification

Matter of Kleinman v. McCoy, 30 N.Y.2d 130 (1972)

Under New York’s court unification provisions, the power to appoint and control court personnel generally shifted from local boards of justices to the Appellate Divisions, except where specifically reserved by statute, such as for personal assistants to judges.

Summary

Kleinman, a clerk of the Supreme Court, Kings County, challenged the Appellate Division’s authority to withhold pay raises previously granted. The Court of Appeals held that the Appellate Division, under the court unification provisions of the New York Constitution and Judiciary Law, possessed the authority to withhold these raises. The court distinguished this case from Matter of Gilligan v. Procaccino, emphasizing that the power to appoint personal assistants to judges was specifically reserved, unlike the general administrative powers over court staff that devolved upon the Appellate Divisions.

Facts

Kleinman was appointed clerk of the Supreme Court, Kings County, in 1954. Legislation in 1961 and 1962 provided pay raises for nonjudicial court personnel, but allowed the appointing authority to withhold increases if unwarranted. In 1964, the Presiding Justices of the Appellate Division in the First and Second Judicial Departments withheld Kleinman’s pay raises, citing their authority under the court unification provisions effective September 1, 1962.

Procedural History

Kleinman initiated a proceeding claiming he was underpaid because the Appellate Division lacked the authority to withhold his pay raises. Special Term denied the application and dismissed the petition. The Appellate Division, Third Department, affirmed the determination, with one Justice dissenting. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

Issue(s)

Whether, under the court unification provisions of the New York Constitution and Judiciary Law, the Appellate Division in the Second Judicial Department was the “appropriate appointing authority” empowered to withhold pay raises from the clerk of the Supreme Court, Kings County.

Holding

Yes, because the court unification provisions vested administrative powers, including the authority to withhold pay raises, in the Appellate Divisions, except where specific statutes reserved such powers.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals reasoned that while the Board of Justices of the Supreme Court, Kings County, was initially the appropriate appointing authority under Section 168 of the Judiciary Law, the court unification provisions of the State Constitution (Article VI) and the Judiciary Law (Article 7-A), effective September 1, 1962, transferred this power to the Appellate Division. Section 28 of Article VI of the Constitution grants broad supervisory power to the Appellate Divisions over the administration of courts within their departments. Section 214 of Article 7-A of the Judiciary Law implements this authority, stating that each Appellate Division is vested with “all administrative powers and duties vested pursuant to any provision of law in any judicial or non-judicial personnel of the courts in its department.”

The court distinguished Matter of Gilligan v. Procaccino, where it held that the Presiding Justices were not the appropriate appointing authorities for nonlawyer “law secretaries” to Supreme Court Justices. The court emphasized that in Gilligan, Section 222 of the Judiciary Law specifically reserved the power of individual judges or justices to appoint their personal assistants. As the court stated, “the power of an individual Judge or Justice to appoint his personal assistants was expressly reserved and continued. It did not devolve upon the Appellate Divisions.” In Kleinman’s case, no such specific reservation existed, thus the Appellate Division’s power was valid. The court effectively demonstrated how the general rule of unified administrative control yields to specific statutory exceptions.