People v. Culhane, 33 N.Y.2d 90 (1973)

A prospective juror should be excused for cause if their statements or background demonstrate a state of mind that would prevent them from impartially trying the case, and the statutory oath designed to address potential bias must be administered completely and unequivocally.

Summary

Culhane and McGivern were convicted of felony murder. The Court of Appeals reversed the convictions due to the trial court’s erroneous refusal to excuse four prospective jurors for cause after they expressed bias or demonstrated a background that suggested partiality. The court emphasized that when a defendant’s peremptory challenges are exhausted, an erroneous denial of a challenge for cause is reversible error. The court found that the expurgatory oath, designed to remove bias, was either not properly administered or was contradicted by the jurors’ subsequent statements, thus warranting a new trial.

Facts

Culhane, Bowerman, and McGivern, prisoners, were being transported when an incident occurred resulting in the death of Deputy Sheriff Fitzgerald and prisoner Bowerman. Culhane and McGivern were subsequently charged with felony murder. Prior to and during the trial, the case received extensive local media coverage. During jury selection, many prospective jurors admitted to having knowledge of the case and forming opinions about the defendants’ guilt. Several potential jurors were also correction officers, as were the victim and a key witness.

Procedural History

The defendants were convicted in Ulster County Court after a second trial, the first having resulted in a hung jury. They appealed directly to the New York Court of Appeals because the death penalty was imposed. The Appellate Division had previously denied their motions for a change of venue. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial.

Issue(s)

Whether the trial court erred in refusing to excuse certain prospective jurors for cause, thereby violating the defendants’ right to an impartial jury.

Holding

Yes, because the prospective jurors demonstrated actual bias or a background suggesting partiality, and the expurgatory oath was either not properly administered or was contradicted by subsequent statements, thus warranting a new trial.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals held that the trial court committed reversible error by failing to excuse four prospective jurors for cause. The court noted that under the law at the time (Code Crim. Pro., § 376), a juror could be challenged for “actual bias,” defined as a state of mind that would prevent them from trying the issue impartially. While prior opinions were not automatically disqualifying if the juror declared on oath that the opinion would not influence their verdict and the court was satisfied, the court found these jurors demonstrated bias that was not properly addressed.

Specifically, the court examined the voir dire of each juror. Some jurors openly admitted to having formed opinions about the defendants’ guilt, while others, like corrections officer Davis, expressed views suggesting they would be less likely to believe testimony from prisoners. Regarding the expurgatory oath, the court emphasized that it must be administered completely and unequivocally. “It is not enough to be able to point to detached language which, alone considered, would seem to meet the statute requirement, if, on construing the whole declaration together, it is apparent that the juror is not able to express an absolute belief that his opinion will not influence his verdict”. In this case, the oath was either not administered at all, administered incompletely, or contradicted by the jurors’ subsequent statements. As an example, “Venireman Davis, the corrections officer who found it ‘rather difficult’ to believe prisoners or to accept the possibility that the defendants had not attempted to escape, was never given an oath whatsoever, either in whole or in part.” Because the trial court failed to ensure an impartial jury, the Court of Appeals reversed the conviction. The court also suggested that a change of venue might be advisable for the new trial, given the extensive pre-trial publicity.