City of Buffalo v. Mildred Mangan, 35 N.Y.2d 308 (1974)
When a finding of unlawful discrimination is made, the decision to award back pay is within the discretion of the Commissioner of Human Rights, and that decision will not be overturned unless it is arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.
Summary
This case addresses the scope of appellate review over an award of back pay by the Commissioner of Human Rights in a discrimination case. Police matrons filed complaints alleging sex discrimination by the Buffalo Police Department. The Commissioner found discrimination and ordered back pay. The Appellate Division reversed on the back pay issue, reasoning that the wage disparity was due to the overqualification of male turnkeys, not underpayment of the matrons. The New York Court of Appeals held that the Appellate Division erred; the Commissioner’s decision to award back pay was not arbitrary or capricious, even if a denial of back pay would have been equally reasonable. The Court emphasized that awarding back pay is a normal sanction for unlawful discrimination, supporting its decision with federal case law.
Facts
Police matrons employed by the Buffalo Police Department filed formal complaints with the Division of Human Rights, alleging that the department discriminated against them based on sex.
Following a hearing, the Commissioner of Human Rights found that the Police Department had engaged in unlawful discriminatory practices.
As part of the remedy, the Commissioner ordered the City of Buffalo to pay the matrons back pay to compensate them for the discriminatory wage differential.
Procedural History
The Commissioner of Human Rights found discrimination and ordered back pay.
The Division of Human Rights Appeal Board reversed the Commissioner’s order regarding discrimination, rendering the back pay issue moot.
The Appellate Division reversed the Appeal Board and reinstated the Commissioner’s finding of discrimination but reversed on the back pay award.
The New York Court of Appeals initially affirmed the discrimination finding but dismissed the matrons’ cross-appeal regarding back pay due to lack of aggrievement.
The Court of Appeals then granted permission for the matrons to appeal the back pay issue.
Issue(s)
Whether the Appellate Division was justified in setting aside the Commissioner’s determination to award back pay to the police matrons, based on a finding of unlawful sex discrimination by the Buffalo Police Department.
Holding
Yes, because the Commissioner’s decision to award back pay was not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion, and therefore the Appellate Division erred in setting it aside. The Commissioner’s choice to award back pay, in the face of competing considerations, cannot be overturned simply because the opposite decision would have been equally reasonable and sustainable.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court focused on the limited scope of appellate review over the Commissioner’s determination. The statute provides the Commissioner with discretion to award back pay when unlawful discrimination is found. The question for the appellate court is not whether back pay should have been awarded de novo, but whether the Commissioner’s decision was so unreasonable as to be an abuse of discretion.
The Court noted that “the normal remedy for a compensation differential made unlawful because based on illegal discrimination would more or less automatically be to grant the injured employees back pay as well as prospectively to order elimination of the discrimination.”
The Court rejected the Appellate Division’s rationale that the wage disparity was due to the overqualification of male turnkeys rather than the underpayment of the matrons. Even if that argument was persuasive, it was for the Commissioner to weigh in the first instance. The Commissioner’s decision to award back pay was within the bounds of his discretion.
The Court drew support from federal case law interpreting the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal Pay Act of 1963, which favors awarding back pay to remedy unlawful employment discrimination. Cases cited include Cooper v. Phillip Morris, Inc. and Robinson v. Lorillard Corp.
The Court also noted that the scope of review available to the Division of Human Rights Appeal Board is limited to whether the Commissioner’s decision was “arbitrary, capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion”. The scope of review at the Appellate Division level is no broader. The court implied a standard of review similar to an Article 78 proceeding.
The court stated, “In the face of competing considerations, the commissioner chose to award back pay. We do not see how that determination can now be set aside as erroneous as a matter of law; certainly not merely because the opposite decision would have been reasonable and also sustainable.”