Feblot v. New York Times Co., 32 N.Y.2d 486 (1973)
Res ipsa loquitur is inapplicable in cases where the plaintiff had control over the instrumentality (here, a self-service elevator door) causing the injury and the accident could have occurred without the defendant’s negligence.
Summary
Eve Marie Feblot sued the New York Times Company for injuries sustained when a self-service elevator door closed on her. The trial court submitted the case to the jury on a res ipsa loquitur theory, and the jury found for Feblot. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that res ipsa loquitur was inapplicable because Feblot had control over the elevator doors and the accident could have happened without negligence on the part of the New York Times Company. The court also found that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of a prior inconsistent statement made by a witness.
Facts
Miss Feblot, a 63-year-old masseuse, visited Arthur Hays Sulzberger’s office on the 14th floor of the New York Times Building. While entering a self-service elevator to leave, the elevator door closed on her, striking her right shoulder and arm. She claimed the door closed suddenly and forcefully, causing injury. The elevator was equipped with a rubber safety edge. The receptionist, Griffin, was present in the corridor.
Procedural History
The trial court dismissed the complaint against Westinghouse (the elevator service company) but denied the New York Times’ motion to dismiss. The case was submitted to the jury against the New York Times solely on the theory of res ipsa loquitur. The jury returned a verdict for Feblot. The New York Times’ motions to set aside the verdict, for dismissal, and for a directed verdict were denied. The New York Times appealed.
Issue(s)
- Whether the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was applicable under the presented facts.
- Whether the Trial Justice erred in excluding from evidence the written accident report of Zaccor and in refusing to allow Zaccor to give the complete account of the accident, as reported to him by the receptionist, Griffin, after the door therefor had been opened on the plaintiff’s cross-examination of Zaccor?
Holding
- No, because the plaintiff had some control over the elevator door, and the incident could have occurred without negligence on the part of the defendant.
- Yes, because the plaintiff opened the door to this testimony on cross-examination.
Court’s Reasoning
The court reasoned that res ipsa loquitur applies only when the instrumentality causing the injury is in the exclusive control of the defendant, and the accident would not ordinarily occur without negligence. The court stated, “[I]f the instrumentality causing the injury to the plaintiff was ‘in the exclusive possession and control of the person charged with negligence * * * and * * * the accident would not ordinarily have occurred without neglect of some duty owed to the plaintiff’.” In this case, Feblot had some control over the elevator doors, as she activated the mechanism controlling their operation and determined when and how to enter the elevator. The court noted she could have caused the doors to reopen by touching the safety edge. The court distinguished this case from falling elevator or defective interlock cases, where the plaintiff has no control over the elevator’s mechanism.
Furthermore, the court held it was error to exclude the written accident report of Zaccor and his testimony regarding Griffin’s account of the accident. Because plaintiff’s counsel questioned Zaccor on cross-examination about the report and his conversation with Griffin, the defendant should have been allowed to present the full account of the report to the jury. The court reasoned that “the plaintiff’s attorney on his cross-examination of Zaccor so far exceeded the limits of proper cross-examination in bringing out further matters, which were not mentioned on direct examination and which created such a wholly erroneous impression in the minds of the jury as to the content of the oral report of the accident which Zaccor had received from Griffin, that Times clearly should have been afforded an opportunity to present the full account of this report to the jury.”